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A SUGGESTED MARRIAGE CONTRACT FOR LOUISIANA*
The Louisiana Civil Code furnishes ample statutory basis
for the contracting of a conjugal association to modify or sup-
plant the community of acquets or gains otherwise imposed by
law. Articles 1967,1 2325,2 2332,8 2333,4 2392,8 2399,6 and 24247 of
the Civil Code permit the future spouses to agree on any con-
jugal association in lieu of the legal community, so long as this
is done before the celebration of the marriage, in the case of
couples domiciled in this state, or within one year after settling
in this state, in the case of couples who remove to Louisiana.8
* This article was prepared in conjunction with the Awards Program
of the Institute of Civil Law Studies at the Louisiana State University Law
School.
1. LA. Civ. CoDo art. 1967: "The aZw, intended by the rule before referred
to, means such legislative provisions as provide for those cases in which
the parties have not declared their intention. When the contracting parties
have not derogated from such law, its provisions are to be followed. The
laws directing a community of matrimonial gains and a warranty on sales,
are examples of this kind of legislative provision (provisions), which take
effect and regulate the contract when the parties make no agreement that
contravene them."
2. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2325: "In relation to property, the law only regu-
lates the conjugal association, In default of particular agreements, which the
parties are at liberty to stipulate as they please, provided they be not con-
trary to good morals, and under the modifications hereafter prescribed."
3. LA. CiV. CODs art. 2332: "The partnership, or community of aquets
(acquets) or gains, needs not to be stipulated; It exists by operation of law,
in all cases where there Is no stipulation to the contrary. But the parties
may modify or limit it; they may even agree that it shall not exist." See also
LA. COv. CODE art. 1901: "Agreements legally entered into have the effect of
laws on those who have formed them. They can not be revoked, unless by
mutual consent of the parties, or for causes acknowledged by law. They
must be performed with good faith."
4. LA. Crv. CoDo art. 2333: "From the various conventions which are
customary in marriage contracts, or which are a consequence of the mar-
riage, result various distinctions with respect to the property which may
be the object of these conventions."
5. LA. CIv. COD art. 2392: "Married persons may stipulate that there
shall be no partnership between them."
6. LA. Civ. Coos art. 2399: "Every marriage contracted In this State,
superinduces of right partnership or community of acquets or gains, if there
be no stipulation to the contrary."
7. LA Civ. CoD art. 2424: "Married persons may, by their marriage) con-
tract, modify the legal community as they think fit, either by agreeing that
the portions shall be unequal, or by specifying the property, belonging to
either of them, of which the fruits shall not enter Into the partnership."
8. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329: "Every matrimonial agreement can be altered
by the husband and wife jointly before the celebration of marriage; but It
cannot be altered after the celebration. Provided that In the case of married
couples removing to this State and settling therein from other States and
countries after marriage, they shall have the right at any time within one
year after the passage of this Act, or a like period after such settlement in
this State, to make a valid marriage contract, subject In all other respects
to the laws of this State."
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This contractual freedom is limited in but few ways. The parties
cannot alter the legal order of succession either with respect
to themselves in what concerns the inheritance of their children
or posterity or with respect to their children between them-
selves.9 In the same manner they cannot derogate from the
rights resulting from the power of the husband over his wife
and children, or which belongs to him as head of the family,
nor from the prohibitory provisions of the Civil Code. 0 Every
matrimonial agreement must be made by an act before a notary
public and two witnesses."
Although numerous decisions by Louisiana courts,' 2 and by
federal courts applying Louisiana law, 3 have enforced marriage
9. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2326: "Husband and wife can in no case enter into
any agreement or make any renunciation, the object of which would be to
alter the legal order of descents, either with respect to themselves in
what concerns the inheritance of their children or posterity, or with respect
to their children between themselves, without any prejudice to the dona-
tions inter vivos or mortis causa, which may take place according to the
formalities and in the cases determined by this Code."
10. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2327: "Neither can husband and wife derogate by
their matrimonial agreement from the rights resulting from the power of
the husband over the person of his wife and children, or which belong to
the husband as the head of the family, nor from the rights granted to the
surviving husband or wife by the title: Of Father and Child, and by the
title: Of Minors, of their Tutorship and Emancipation, nor from the pro-
hibitory dispositions of this Code."
11. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2328: "Every matrimonial agreement must be made
by an act before a notary and two witnesses."
12. Succession of Woolfolk, 225 La. 1, 71 So.2d 861 (1954); Succession
of Hollander, 208 La, 1038, 24 So.2d 69 (1945); Fontenot v. Manuel, 170 La.
467, 128 So. 279 (1930); Fontenot v. Fontenot, 157 La. 511, 102 So. 590
(1925); Succession of LeBesque, 137 La. 567, 68 So. 956 (1915); Succession
of Graf, 125 La. 197, 51 So. 115 (1909); Didlake v. Cappel, 116 La. 844, 41
So. 112 (1906); Delpit v. Young, 52 La. Ann. 1071, 27 So. 583 (1900); Starns v.
Hadnot, 45 La. Ann. 318, 12 So. 561 (1893); Hanley v. Drumm, 31 La. Ann.
106 (1879); Barrow v. Stevens, 27 La. Ann. 343 (1875); Newman v. Eaton,
27 La. Ann. 341 (1875); Desobry v. Schlater, 25 La. Ann. 425 (1873); Suc-
cession of Wilder, 22 La. Ann. 219 (1870); Lapice v. Lapice, 21 La. Ann. 226
(1869); Miller v. Rougieux, 20 La. Ann. 577 (1868); Howard v. Zeyer, 18
La. Ann. 407 (1866); Nixon v. Piffet, 16 La. Ann. 379 (1861); Wood v. Stokes,
13 La. Ann. 143 (1858); Stratton v. Rogers, 11 La. Ann. 380 (1856); Rochereau
v. Jonau, 11 La. Ann. 598 (1856); Succession of DeBellisle, 10 La. Ann. 468
(1855); Spears v. Shropshire, 10 La. Ann. 218 (1855); DeYoung v. DeYoung,
6 La. Ann. 786 (1851); Deshautels v. Fontenot, 6 La. Ann. 689 (1851); Mor-
gan v. Yarborough, 5 La. Ann. 316 (1850); Succession of Mossy, 4 La. Ann.
337 (1849); Young v. Templeton, 4 La. Ann. 254 (1849); Fabre v. Sparks,
12 Rob. 31 (La. 1845); Criswell v. Seay, 19 La. 528 (1841); Flores v. Lemee,
16 La. 271 (1840); Union Bank v. Slidell, 11 La. 23 (1837); Tourne v. Tourne,
9 La. 452 (1836); Guilbeau's Heirs v. Cormier, 2 La. 6 (1830); Saul v. His
Creditors, 5 Mart. (N.S.) 569 (La. 1827); Rowel v. Buhler, 3 Mart. (N.S.)
348 (La. 1825); DeArmas v. Hampton, 6 Mart. (O.S.) 567 (La. 1819); Rion
v. Rion's Syndics, 4 Mart. (O.S.) 591 (La. 1817); Rion v. Rion's Syndics,
4 Mart. (O.S.) 341 (La. 1816); Joubert v. Sylvester, 230 So.2d 673 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1970); Succession of Tullier, 53 So.2d 455 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951).
13. Carter v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 595, 597 (E.D. La. 1967), rev'd
on other grounds, 399 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1968). Clay v. United States, 161
F.2d 607, 609-10 (5th Cir. 1947).
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contracts, the practice of drawing up marriage contracts
has fallen into disuse in Louisiana. 14 It is the purpose of this
Comment to suggest a practical approach to the making of
such contracts in the hope that interest in them may be re-
vived. An attempt is not made at any broad historical survey
of the nature or evolution of the marriage contract; rather,
the contract is urged as a functional answer to some of the
almost overwhelming problems created by the Louisiana law
of community property.1 5 Consideration is not given to the
threshold determination of the comparative advantages and dis-
advantages of living separate in property or of agreeing upon
some form of a community of gains. The following marriage
contract, set out in full, is directed to spouses who have resolved
that question in favor of a community of gains. Each provision
of the contract is only a suggestion. Of course, infinite variation
is possible, as warranted by conditions peculiar to the parties
contemplating marriage.
MARRIAGE CONTRACT
1. and , in contemplation of their
14. See Morrow, Matrimonial Property Law in Louisiana, 34 TUL. L.
Rsv. 3, 11 (1959): "In spite of these elaborate provisions concerning mar-
riage contract and dowry, however, as a practical matter these legal insti-
tutions have long since become obsolete. It has been reported that a
sampling of parish records in Louisiana reveals that the use of marriage
contracts, except in rare and scattered instances, had ceased by 1880. It
appears that in one parish where French influences remain relatively
strong, the custom has persisted to some extent of registering before mar-
riage an inventory of the property of the prospective husband and wife.
Otherwise, the device may be presumed to be used today only by a few
mature persons of means who are contemplating marriage and wish to
contract away the community regime."
15. The existence of such problems was noted in Daggett, Policy Ques-
tions on Marital Property Law in Louisiana, 14 LA. L. REv. 528 (1954):
"The purpose of this discussion is to emphasize the confusion, inequities,
and maladjustments to social and economic realities presently existing in
the marital property law of Louisiana . . . . Re-examination of the com-
munity property system has been thought necessary for quite some time
because its adherents fear that, without adjustment to present conditions,
dissatisfactions may become sufficiently acute to result in its abandonment.
Its complexities are so great that its acceptability can be maintained only
by clear demonstration of achievement of its worthy basic objects, those
best strengthening the ties and economic basis of the family."
The utility of marriage contracts was pointed out in Huie, Separate
Ownership of Specific Property Versus Restitution from Community Prop-
erty in Louisiana, 26 TUL. L. REv. 427, 431 (1952): "Professor Daggett has
brought to the attention of the legal profession in Louisiana the useful-
ness of marriage contracts as a means of avoiding future controversies and
has urged their general use. Many problems that now furnish sources of
litigation could be avoided by a marriage contract, and there is a special
need for such a contract in order to simplify the restitution of separate
capital."
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forthcoming marriage, enter into the following marriage con-
tract.
2. Prior to the celebration of the marriage, an inventory of
all of the assets and liabilities of the respective parties shall be
taken. This inventory shall form a part of and be recorded with
the marriage contract.
3. The following are to be separate assets, regardless of
which spouse exercises administration and control of them:
(1) All things brought into marriage by either spouse;
(2) Things received by either spouse alone through gra-
tuitous donation, including interspousal donations;
(3) Things acquired by either spouse by inheritance;
(4) The fruits, revenues, and income from each spouse's
separate asset, except as provided in Article Four, Paragraph
Six;
(5) Wages or salary of either spouse earned while the
spouses are living separate and apart;
(6) Damages recovered for personal injuries arising
from offenses or quasi-offenses, and for personal injuries
arising from the breach of a contract relating to separate or
community assets;
(7) Things acquired during marriage with separate
funds or in exchange for separate assets, with no necessity
for a declaration of separateness or for a particular form of
proof of separateness;
(8) Things acquired during marriage with both separate
and community assets, if separate assets and community
assets each compose at least 25% of the cost of acquisition
and if it is proved that the spouses intended the things
acquired to be separate assets of the spouse contributing
separate assets to the acquisition, subject to the claim of
the other spouse for reimbursement of half the value of
community assets used in the acquisition;
(9) All things which have a uniquely personal character,
such as clothing, regardless of how they are acquired;
(10) Intellectual assets, such as copyrights, trademarks,
patents, and publishable works of every sort;
(11) The interest of either spouse in partnership capital,
whether acquired before or during marriage, subject to the
obligation of reimbursing the other spouse half the value
of community assets diverted to the use of the partnership.
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4. The following are to fall into the community of gains
between the spouses:
(1) Things acquired during marriage with community
funds or in exchange for community assets;
(2) Things acquired during marriage with both separate
and community assets, if separate assets and community
assets each comprise at least 25% of the cost of acquisition
and if it is proved that the spouses intended the things
acquired to be community assets, subject to the claim of
the spouse contributing separate assets for reimbursement
from the other spouse of half the value of the amount so
contributed;
(3) Wages and salaries of both spouses while living
together;
(4) The fruits, revenues, and income of community
assets;
(5) Donations made to the spouses without designation
of shares;
(6) All income, royalties, and revenues received during
marriage while the spouses are living together under any
agreement relating to the intellectual assets specified in
Article Three, Paragraph Ten.
5. The following provisions shall govern life insurance inso-
far as it concerns the conventional community:
(1) The policy rights belonging to an insured spouse
who has named the other spouse revocable beneficiary shall
be a separate asset of the insured, whether the contract of
insurance was taken out before or after marriage, subject
to the obligation of reimbursing the other spouse half the
value of community assets used to pay the premiums or to
otherwise support the insurance contract if the community
is dissolved prior to death, or in the event that the insured
spouse receives the cash surrender value or otherwise ap-
propriates the cash value of the policy to his personal
benefit. If the insured spouse has relinquished all policy
rights by naming the other spouse irrevocable beneficiary,
or by assigning the policy to the other spouse, the policy
rights shall be a separate asset of the beneficiary or assignee,
subject to the preceding obligation of reimbursement in the
instances mentioned.
(2) When the insured spouse has either revocably or
irrevocably designated the other spouse as beneficiary, or
[Vol. 31
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if either spouse has insured the life of the other spouse
naming himself or herself revocable or irrevocable bene-
ficiary, the beneficiary spouse shall receive the proceeds as
separate assets, whether the contract was taken out before
or after marriage. No obligation of reimbursement shall be
enforceable against the beneficiary in favor of the succes-
sion of the deceased spouse for half the value of community
assets used to keep up the policy unless, during marriage,
the deceased spouse expresses an intent to avail himself
or herself of the right to reimbursement.
(3) If a policy on the life of either spouse is made pay-
able to the insured's succession or to the legal representative
of the insured, the proceeds shall be separate assets, subject
to the obligation of reimbursement due the other spouse
for half the value of community assets used to support the
policy.
6. The following provision shall alone govern payments
received during marriage as a substitute for, or as a supplement
to, wages or earnings:
The right of either spouse to receive any benefits in lieu
of or as a supplement to wages or earnings is a separate
asset of that spouse; but all such benefits actually received
by that spouse during marriage while the spouses are living
together shall fall into the community of gains between the
spouses, regardless of whether the scheme, plan, or agree-
ment providing for such benefits was entered into before or
after marriage; provided that upon termination of the com-
munity by a cause other than death, the spouse not entitled
to the benefits shall be entitled to reimbursement of half
the value of community assets used to support the right to
the benefits to the extent that that spouse's half interest
in any benefits actually received during marriage as com-
munity assets has not equalled this amount; provided fur-
ther, that upon termination of the community by death,
no obligation of reimbursement shall be enforceable as a
consequence of any assets expended in support of the right
to receive the benefits, unless the spouse entitled to reim-
bursement evidenced during marriage an intent to avail him-
self or herself of the right to reimbursement.
7. The following provision alone shall govern property
insurance:
1971]
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All proceeds from policies insuring assets from any risk
shall acquire the status of the asset which such proceeds
restore or for the loss of which the insured is indemnified,
subject to the obligation of reimbursement as described in
Article Nine.
8. This marriage contract shall in no way create any pre-
sumption as to the classification of any thing, movable or im-
movable, corporeal or incorporeal, as a separate or community
asset. The classification of all things, if put in issue, is to be
proved as any other fact in a civil case, i.e., by a preponderance
of the evidence.
9. Except as otherwise provided by this contract, if com-
munity assets are used in the interest of the separate assets of
either spouse, whether the separate assets are enhanced in value
or not, the other spouse is entitled to be reimbursed half the
value of the community assets so expended. Where separate
assets of either spouse are used in the interest of community
assets, whether this results in enhancement of the community
assets or not, the contributing spouse is entitled to reimburse-
ment from the other spouse of half the value of the separate
assets so expended. Neither spouse shall be entitled to com-
pensation nor reimbursement for labor bestowed on the separate
assets of either spouse, whether the separate assets are enhanced
in value or not, unless it is in the form of wages or salary.
10. The husband is the head and master of the community
of gains between the spouses, and he alone can incur obligations
chargeable against the community assets, of which he has sole
administration and control. He can dispose of community assets
without the consent of the wife, subject to the following modi-
fications:
(1) He can not dispose, by onerous title, of immovables
of the community standing in the name of the wife with-
out her written consent;
(2) He can make no disposition inter vivos, by gratui-
tous title, of immovables or of incorporeal movables of the
community without the consent of the wife;
(3) A gratuitous title within the contemplation of this
provision embraces all titles wherein there is no direct,
material advantage to the donor;
(4) If it should be proved that the husband has made
[Vol. 31
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any disposition of community assets without the consent of
the wife, where her consent is required, or in fraud of her
rights, she shall have an action at the termination of the
community against him or his heirs for the recovery of the
value of her interest.
(5) The wife's consent shall not be required during her
continued absence, or where by reason of infirmity she is
incapable of making an informed judgment.
11. Although the wife's interest in the community assets is
one of ownership, it is subject to the administration and control
of the husband, and she is powerless to act for or in the place
of her husband without his authority, express, implied, or
customary. However, the wife shall have full administration
and control of community assets in the continued absence of
her husband, or where by reason of infirmity he is incapable
of himself exercising administration and control.
12. As between husband and wife, obligations incurred dur-
ing the existence of the community by the husband alone, or
by the wife, acting for or in the place of her husband, shall be
satisfied out of community assets, with the following exceptions:
(1) Obligations incurred by either spouse solely in the
interest of his or her separate assets are chargeable to that
spouse's separate assets;
(2) The liability of either spouse for his or her offenses
or quasi-offenses shall be satisfied out of that spouse's
separate assets;
(3) If community assets should be insufficient to satisfy
the alimentary obligations existing between the spouses
themselves or between a spouse and his legitimate children,
the spouses are bound to support these obligations out of
their separate assets in proportion to the relative amount
owned by each during the period when the obligations are
due.
13. During marriage, third persons may seek satisfaction for
obligations incurred by the husband before or during marriage
and for obligations incurred by the wife acting for or in the
place of her husband from the husband alone, unless the wife
has also bound herself personally for these obligations; pro-
vided, that both spouses shall be liable personally and in solido
to third persons for the alimentary obligations described in
Article Twelve, Paragraph Three.
19711
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14. When the community is terminated for any cause, the
wife's acceptance of the former community shall constitute an
unconditional assumption of personal responsibility for half
of the obligations chargeable to it, whereupon she is entitled
of right without the necessity of giving security to half the
assets and to an immediate partition of the same. She may avoid
liability for all obligations of the former community for which
she has not assumed personal liability by renouncing the same,
in which case she is not entitled to receive any of the assets.
She may limit her liability to half the value of the assets by
accepting with benefit of inventory, in which case she consents
to an administration of the community and agrees to receive
only half the value remaining after the debts have been paid.
Explanation of the Contract
Article One
This provision is simply a declaration of the intention of
the future spouses to avoid the institution of the legal com-
munity of acquets or gains and to establish a conventional
property arrangement in its stead. In order to affect third per-
sons, recordation of the marriage contract appears to be required
both in the conveyance records of the parish where the matri-
monial domicile is to be established 6 and in the mortgage and
conveyance records of any parish where immovable property
belonging to either spouse is located. 17 To assure future effective-
16. This requirement derives from the following two Civil Code articles
which, while not specifically dealing with marriage contracts, are suggested
as functionally analogous. LA. CIv. CODE art. 155: "Separation from bed and
board carries with it separation of goods and effects. Upon reconciliation of
the spouses, the community may be reestablished by husband and wifejointly, as of the date of the filing of the suit for separation from bed and
board, by an act before a notary and two witnesses, which act shall be
recorded in the conveyance office of the parish where said parties are domi-
ciled but which act shall be without prejudice to rights validly acquired in
the interim."
LA. CIv. CODE art. 2386 contains the following recordation requirement
where the wife reserves the fruits of her separate property: "The said
instrument shall be executed before a Notary Public and two witnesses and
duly recorded in the Conveyance Records of the Parish where the commu-
nity is domiciled."
17. This requirement is based on the following three Civil Code articles.
LA. CM. CODE art. 2264: "No notarial act concerning immovable property shall
have any effect against third persons, until the same have been deposited in
the office of the parish recorder, or register of conveyances of the parish
where such immovable property is situated."
LA. CIv. CODE art. 2265: "All sales of immovable property made by any sheriff
or other officer, by virtue of any execution or other order of court; all mar-
riage contracts made within this State, tending in any wise to convey,
transfer, assure or affect the estates of the parties, or being only intended
[Vol. 31
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ness against third persons, recordation should be repeated when
the matrimonial domicile is changed to a different parish or when
additional immovables are acquired in a different parish by
either spouse.
Article Two
An inventory of all assets and liabilities of the respective
spouses at the beginning of the marriage is suggested not only
to establish the separate character of these assets, but to facilitate
proof at the termination of the community of this separate
status.' Hopefully, this will avoid the systematic classification
of separate assets as community assets because of an inability
to trace the source of the assets.
Article Three
This article is of paramount importance: it defines what
things remain the separate assets of each spouse. The principle
purpose of this article is to facilitate the acquisition and main-
tenance of separate assets, if the parties so desire. 19
to ascertain the dotal rights of the wife, or that her marriage portion is
liable to some reserves, or stipulated to be paraphernal or extradotal prop-
erty; and all final judgments affecting immovable property shall be recorded
in the parish where the immovable property is situated."
L. . Civ. CODE art. 2334, which provides in part: "Where the title to immov-
able property stands In the names of both the husband and wife, it may
not be leased, mortgaged or sold by the husband without the wife's written
authority or consent where she has made a declaration by authentic act
that her authority and consent are required for such lease, sale or
mortgage and has filed such declaration in the mortgage and conveyance
records of the parish in which the property is situated." See also H. DAo-
GETT, THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM OP LOUISIANA 116 (1945).
18. See H. DAGGETT, THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM Op LOUISIANA 115-16
(1945): "In Evangeline Parish, an interesting use of the form of marriage
contract is found, which, though called a marriage contract, is little more
if anything than a registration of an inventory of the effects of the In-
dividuals contemplating marriage. This use, however, is common, it would
seem, 264 of these contracts have been filed since 1911 when the parish was
formed. It may readily be seen that such a formality which could be gone
through with at any time, but probably would not be will make the ultimate
settling of community affairs, when the spouses start with much property,
an infinitely easier task than the judicial 'guesswork' which the court is
forced to struggle with in the settling of the community." See also Hute,
Separate Ownership of Specific Property Versus Restitution From Commu-
nity Property In Louisiana, 26 TUL. L. REv. 427, 431 (1952), where a proce-
dure of appraisement of the value and intended status of the property
brought into marriage is recommended in order to make easier the restitu-
tion at the dissolution of the community.
19. See Daggett, Policy Questions on Marital Property Law in Lou-
isiana, 14 LA. L. REV. 528, 541-42 (1954), wherein Professor Daggett listed
seven ways in which she considered the trend toward placing all marital
property in the community to be deleterious. However, a contrary opinion
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Paragraph One provides that all things brought into mar-
riage by either spouse shall continue to be the separate assets
of that spouse. In this respect it does not differ from article
2334 of the Civil Code. The separate status of these assets
should be easier to maintain, however, through the requirement
of an inventory found in Article Two. Similarly, as provided in
article 2334 of the Civil Code,2 1 things received by either party
alone through gratuitous donation, including interspousal dona-
tions, remain separate assets. No change is made in Paragraph
Three in stipulating that things acquired by either spouse
through inheritance are separate assets.22
The first major departure from the principles of the legal
community is found in Paragraph Four, which states that fruits
and revenues of the spouses' separate assets shall constitute sep-
arate assets, regardless of by whom the separate assets are ac-
tually administered. This provision departs from articles 2386 and
2402 of the Civil Code, which provide that fruits of separate
assets fall into the community. The latter rule admits of an
exception in favor of the wife alone in that she can file a written
statement preserving the fruits of her separate property for her
separate use and benefit.2 The suggested change should have
was expressed in Morrow, Matrimonial Property Law in Louisiana, 34 TUL. L.
REv. 3, 47 (1959): "In the opinion of the writer, a great clarification could
be accomplished and a fundamental objective of a community property
system achieved, by providing that practically all income and acquisitions
by either spouse during marriage should be classified as community prop-
erty .... "
Decisions as to the characterization of things as separate or community
assets are fundamental ones which largely determine the relative amounts
of separate and community assets during marriage. These choices should
be made after careful consideration of the intentions of the future spouses
in the context of the Louisiana law of succession, forced heirship, and the
usufruct granted the surviving spouse by law. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 871-
933 and 1493-1518.
20. LA CiV. CoDs art. 2334, para. 2: "Separate property is that which
either party brings into the marriage, or acquires during the marriage with
separate funds, or by inheritance, or by donation made to him or her par-
ticularly."
21. Id. See Coney v. Coney, 220 La. 473, 56 So.2d 841 (1951); Houghton
v. Hall, 177 La. 238, 148 So. 37 (1933); Hurst v. W. B. Thompson & Co., 118
La. 57, 42 So. 645 (1907); Lavedan v. Jenkins, 47 La. Ann. 725, 17 So. 256(1895); Savenat v. LeBreton, 1 La. 520 (1830); Flower v. O'Connor, 8 Mart.(N.S.) 555 (La. 1830). See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 1746 and Morrow, Matrimonial
Property Law in Louisiana, 34 TUL L. REv 3, 27 (1959).
22. See note 20 supra.
23. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2402 reads in part as follows: "This partnership
or community consists of the profits of all the effects of which the husband
has the administration and enjoyment, either of right or in fact . . . ." The
first paragraph of LA. CIV, CODE art. 2386 reads as follows: "The fruits of
the paraphernal property of the wife, wherever the property be located and
however administered, whether natural, civil, including interest, dividends
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enormous practical consequences on the composition of the com-
munity. For example, cash dividends on separate stock would
no longer fall into the community ;24 the interest on federal, state,
municipal, and private bonds which are considered separate
property would no longer enter the community; 2 income from
a trust which is a separate asset of one spouse, if distributed to
that spouse, would not fall into the community;26 and rents re-
ceived from separate assets would not enter the community. 27
Expenses for the preservation of separate assets, e.g., taxes and
insurance, would no longer be chargeable to community assets;
the community would not benefit by receiving the fruits of the
separate asset.28 The sole exception to the rule of this paragraph
is found in Paragraph Six of Article Four which states that in-
come, royalties, and revenues from intellectual assets are com-
munity assets.
and rents, or from the the result of labor, fall into the conjugal partnership,
if there exists a community of acquets and gains; unless the wife, by written
instrument, shall declare that she reserves all of such fruits for her own
separate use and benefit and her intention to administer such property
separately and alone. The said instrument shall be executed before a Notary
Public and two witnesses and duly recorded in the Conveyance Records of
the Parish where the community is domiciled."
In this regard see Peltier v. Begovich, 239 La. 238, 118 So.2d 395 (1960);
Succession of Ratcliff, 212 La. 563, 33 So.2d 114 (1947); Mathews v. Hansberry,
71 So.2d 232 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1954). It should be noted that a declaration
by the wife has only been required since 1944; before that time, If the wife
retained the administration of her separate property, the fruits remained
hers. See Trorlicht v. Collector of Revenue, 25 So.2d 547 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1946) and Morrow, MatrimoniaZ Property Law in Louisiana, 34 TUL. L. Rsv. 3,
13, 24 (1959).
24. See Messersmith v. Messersmith, 229 La. 495, 86 So.2d 169 (1956),
holding to the effect that cash dividends on separate stock fall into the
community. No change has been made in the rules of the Louisiana courts
that stock dividends on separate stock remain separate property and that
new shares acquired by a split of separate stock are separate property.
Daigre v. Daigre, 228 La. 682, 83 So.2d 900 (1955); Succession of Hemenway,
228 La. 572, 83 So.2d 377 (1955). See generally Comment, 25 LA. L. Rev. 108,
133-34 (1964); Comment, 33 TUL. L. REv. 811, 813-14 (1959).
25. See Comment, 33 TUL. L. Rmv. 811, 817 (1959): "Ownership of federal,
state, municipal and private bonds not issued pursuant to special legislation
is determined In accordance with general community property principles.
Bonds received by one spouse as a donation or inheritance become the sepa-
rate property of that spouse. Interest on the wife's separate bonds remains
separate property provided she has separate administration of the bonds and,
after 1944, has filed a declaration reserving the Income as paraphernal prop-
erty. Interest on bonds owned by the husband as separate property falls into
the community of acquets and gains. Bonds acquired with community funds
become community property, as does any income which they earn."
26. See Dunham v. Dunham, 174 So.2d 898 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
27. Gregory v. Gregory, 223 So.2d 238 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
28. See Succession of Ratcliff, 209 La. 224, 24 So.2d 456 (1945) and Suc-
cession of Boyer, 36 La. Ann. 506 (1884), holding to the effect that when the
revenues from separate property fall into the community the community
should bear the ordinary expenses of preservation. See also Huie, Separate
Claims To Reimbursement From Community Property In Louisiana, 27
TUL. L. Rav. 143, 159-60 (1953); Comment, 25 LA. L. REV. 201, 207-08 (1964).
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Paragraph Five, which declares the wages or salary of either
spouse to be a separate asset if the spouses are living apart, works
a departure from the Civil Code insofar as the husband is con-
cerned. Article 2334 provides that the wages or salary of the
wife living apart from her husband is her separate property,29
while the wages or salary of the husband enters the community
regardless of whether he is living with his wife.30 The suggested
change puts the husband in the same position as the wife, i.e.,
his wages or salary are a separate asset if he is living apart from
his wife. It is felt that no useful purpose is served by an arbitrary
distinction.81
Paragraph Six modifies and broadens articles 2334 and 2402
of the Civil Code relative to damages recovered by the spouses.
These articles provide that damages for personal injuries to the
wife occasioned by offenses or quasi-offenses are her separate
property,3 2 while such damages to the husband are community
property, unless he is living separate and apart from his wife for
fault on her part sufficient for separation or divorce.88 These rules
are altered to place the husband in a position identical to that
of the wife by allowing him to retain these damages as separate
property under all circumstances. No justification exists for dis-
29. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2334 reads in part as follows: "The earnings of
the wife when living separate and apart from her husband although not
separated by judgment of court, her earnings when carrying on a business,
trade, occupation or industry separate from her husband .. . are her separate
property." See Houghton v. Hall, 177 La. 238, 257, 148 So. 37, 48 (1933);
Lytell v. Lytell, 144 So.2d 925, 926 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962); King v. Dearman,
105 So.2d 293 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958). See also Morrow, Matrimonial Property
Law in Louisiana, 34 TUL. L. Rzv. 3, 14, 24 (1959).
30. See Peltier v. Begovich, 239 La. 238, 249-50, 118 So.2d 395, 399 (1960).
31. In Daggett, Policy Questions on Marital Property Law in Louisiana,
14 LA. L. REv. 528, 544 (1954), this result is urged in the following language:
"Certainly sources of community and separate property whatever they may
be should be the same for both spouses so that equitable division might be
made at the dissolution of the community. . . ." See also Daggett, Is Joint
Control of Community Property Possible?, 10 TUL. L. REv. 589, 590 (1936);
Morrow, Matrimonial Property Law in Louisiana, 34 TUL. L. Rov. 3, 25 (1959).
32. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2334 provides in part: "[Aictions for damages re-
sulting from offenses and quasi offenses . ..are her separate property."
LA. Civ. CODE art. 2402 also provides in part as follows: "But damages
resulting from personal injuries in the wife shall not form part of this
community, but shall always be and remain the separate property of the
wife and recoverable by herself alone .... See Sanders v. P. & S. Ins. Co.,
125 So.2d 24, 27 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960).
33. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2334: "Actions for damages resulting from offenses
and quasi offenses suffered by the husband, living separate and apart from
his wife, by reason of fault on her part, sufficient for separation or divorce
shall be his separate property." See Talley v. Employers Mutual Liab.
Ins. Co., 181 So.2d 784, 787 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 248 La. 785,
181 So.2d 783 (1966).
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tinguishing between husband and wife on the basis of fault.3 4 A
broadening of these principles is accomplished by including as a
separate asset damages for personal injuries suffered by either
spouse as a result of a breach of a contract relating to separate
or community assets.3 5
Major changes are made in Paragraph Seven in regard to the
judicial requirements of proof imposed upon a spouse who ac-
quires things during the existence of the legal community. Al-
though there is no departure from the principle that things ac-
quired during marriage with separate funds or in exchange
for separate assets are separate assets,3 the stipulation in the
contract that no declaration of separateness or particular form
of proof of separateness of the funds or assets involved in the
acquisition is required should be of far-reaching importance. The
courts have enunciated the doctrine that for an immovable ac-
quired by the husband during marriage to be his separate asset,
a double declaration in the act of purchase that he was buying for
his separate benefit and with his separate funds must have been
made. Absent these two declarations, the immovable is presumed
conclusively to belong to the community, even if there has been
a recitation of separateness. 37 As to the wife, the courts have held
that to overcome the presumption that the thing acquired is a
community asset and to establish its separate status, she must
show with legal certainty (1) that the funds used for the pur-
34. In Morrow, Matrimonial Property Law in Louisiana, 34 TUL. L. R:zv.
3, 25 (1959), a similar observation is made: "It is difficult to rationalize this
obvious discrimination between husband and wife, and the distinction must
be attributed to pressures on behalf of married women in the early part of
this century, followed by a belated 'compromise' provision with reference to
the husband." See also Daggett, Is Joint Control of Community Property
Possible?, 10 TUL. REV. 589, 590 n.31 (1936).
35. The Civil Code is limited to characterization of personal injuries
caused by offenses and quasi-offenses. Article Three, Paragraph Six of this
marriage contract is also directed toward the situation where damages for
personal injury are suffered because of a breach of contract, e.g., mental
anguish, embarrassment, humiliation, inconvenience, Injury to reputation,
etc.
36. See, e.g., Dillon v. Freville, 129 La. 1005, 57 So. 316 (1912); Kittredge
v. Grau, 158 La. 154, 103 So. 723 (1925).
37. Smith v. Smith, 230 La. 509, 519-20, 89 So.2d 55, 58-59 (1956); Succes-
sion of Hemenway, 228 La. 572, 581, 590-91, 83 So.2d 377, 380, 383 (1955);
Pearlstine v. Mattes, 233 La. 1032, 1039-40, 67 So.2d 582, 584 (1953): Boulet
v. Fruge, 221 So.2d 602, 604 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969); Hastings v. McDowell,
75 So.2d 383, 384 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954). See Morrow, Matrimonial Property
Law in Louisiana, 34 TUL. L. R1v. 3, 15 (1959); Hule, Separate Ownership Of
Specific Property Versus Restitution From Community Property rn Lou-
isiana, 26 TuL. L. REv. 427, 444-62 (1952). But see Comment, 25 LA. L. Rv.
108, 132 n. 116 (1964), in which It is suggested that the requirement of a
double declaration may not apply at all in the case of movables. In this re-
gard see Bruyninckx v. Woodward, 217 La. 736, 47 So.2d 478 (1950).
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chase were her separate funds, (2) that they were administered
by her, and (3) that they were invested by her.as In addition,
when the wife purchases on credit, she has the further burden
of establishing that she both made the down payment with her
separate funds and that she had sufficient separate funds to
assure, with reasonable certainty, that the deferred payments
could be met.89 Paragraph Seven avoids these formal require-
ments of proof in favor of allowing proof of the character of the
funds used as any other fact in a civil case.
An innovation has been made in Paragraph Eight with the
insertion of a provision which allows things acquired with both
separate and community assets to be separate assets, if the
spouses so intend and if the separate and community assets used
in the acquisition each constitute at least 25% of the cost of
acquisition. If separate assets form less than 25% of the cost
of acquisition, insufficient commingling exists to prevent char-
acterization of the things acquired as community assets.40 Un-
der the legal regime, a presumption of community status gen-
erally prevails, and the thing acquired is held to be a com-
munity asset, subject to reimbursement of the spouse contribut-
ing separate funds for half the amount of his contribution.41
Likewise, under Paragraph Eight, separate or community status
is imposed subject to an obligation of reimbursement for half the
value of the other type of assets used in the acquisition.
Paragraph Nine is a unique provision which is fully justified
38. Southwest Natural Prod. Co. v. Anderson, 239 La. 490, 118 So.2d 897
(1960); Prince v. Hopson, 230 La. 575, 582, 89 So.2d 128, 130 (1956); Smith v.
Smith, 230 La. 509, 520, 89 So.2d 55, 59 (1956); Succession of Schnitter, 220
La. 323, 329-30, 56 So.2d 563, 565 (1952); Houghton v. Hall, 177 La. 238, 244,
148 So. 37, 39 (1933).
39. Graves v. United States Rubber Co., 237 La. 505, 514, 111 So.2d 752,
755 (1959); Butler v. Burks, 99 So.2d 180, 183 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1957). See
Morrow, Matrimonial Property Law in Louisiana, 34 TUL. L. REV. 3, 16 (1959).
40. The writer is dedicated to allowing the intention of the spouses to be
the determinative factor as to the classification of things acquired with both
separate and community assets; but, this 25% limitation is thought to be a
necessary adjunct to providing that assets acquired wholly with separate
funds are separate assets, and that assets acquired wholly with community
funds are community assets. If even the slightest combination of separate
and community assets were permitted to make the acquisitions either sepa-
rate or community assets, no reasonable justification would exist for not
applying such a rule where separate or community assets alone are used in
the acquisition. The writer has sought to preserve uniformity where one type
of assets is used in the acquisition, while allowing the spouses freedom of
characterization where the commingling has been relatively substantial.
41. Abunza v. Olivier, 230 La. 445, 88 So.2d 815 (1956); Succession of
Franek, 224 La. 747, 762, 70 So.2d 670, 676 (1954); Reine v. Reine, 170 La.
839, 129 So. 364 (1930). See also Hule, Separate Claims to Reimbursement
from Community Property in Louisiana, 27 TUL. L. REV. 143, 154-76 (1953).
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as a practical matter. By its terms, items peculiarly personal
are separate assets, regardless of the circumstances of acquisi-
tion.42 Paragraph Ten categorizes intellectual assets as separate
assets, a choice made to avoid difficulties in the valuation of such
rights upon termination of the community. However, income,
royalties, and revenues received from intellectual assets are
community assets.43 A spouse's interest in partnership capital is
characterized by Paragraph Eleven as a separate asset primarily
to avoid the necessity for valuation and division of the interest
in the event the community is terminated prior to death; that
event does not ordinarily signal the dissolution of the partner-
ship. Protection is afforded the other spouse by the right to re-
imbursement of half the value of community assets diverted to
the interest of the partnership. This departs from decisions hold-
ing that a spouse's interest in partnership capital is a separate
assets if a partnership were formed before marriage, but a
community asset if it were formed during marriage.44 Under
Article Nine and Article Four, Paragraph Three, profits received
by a partner-spouse, being remunerations in the nature of wages
or salary, continue to fall into the community if the spouses are
living together.4 5 But the other spouse is no longer entitled, at
the dissolution of the community, to half the enhanced value of
the partner-spouse's interest in partnership capital.46
42. This provision is based on a similar implication which might be
drawn from LA. CIV. CODS art. 2416, which applies when the wife has re-
nounced any rights to the community assets: "Her linen and clothes shall
not, in any case, be comprised In the inventory; she has a right to take
them without any formality."
43. See note 47 supra and Article Four, Paragraph Six of this marriage
contract.
44. Baker v. Baker, 209 La. 1041, 26 So.2d 132 (1946); Kittredge v. Grau,
158 La. 154, 103 So. 723 (1924); Succession of Ferguson, 146 La. 1010, 84 So.
338 (1920); Dubuisson v. Mosely, 232 So.2d 870, 871, 872 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1970); Succession of Hollier, 158 So.2d 351, 355, 357 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963),
cert. granted, 245 La. 648, 160 So.2d 231 (1964), remanded, 247 La. 384, 171
So.2d 656 (1964), on remand, 184 So.2d 790, 792 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 249 La. 203, 186 So.2d 160 (1966).
45. See Succession of Hollier, 158 So.2d 351, 358 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963),
cert. granted on other grounds, 245 La. 648, 160 So.2d 231 (1964). See also
Charles Lob's Sons v. Karnofsky, 177 La. 229, 148 So. 34 (1933); Helberg v.
Hyland, 168 La. 493, 122 So. 593 (1929); Paxton v. Bramlette, 228 So.2d 161
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 255 La. 241, 230 So.2d 92 (1970). See also
Article Four, Paragraph Three of this contract.
46. See Succession of Ferguson, 146 La. 1010, 84 So. 338 (1920); Dubuisson
v. Moseley, 232 So.2d 870, 871, 872 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970), in which the
wife was held entitled to half the value. See also The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970 Term-Matrimonial Regimes, 31 LA. L. REV.
252, 255 (1971); Comment, 37 TUL. L. REv. 506, 508, 509 (1963); Article Nine
of this contract; notes 99 and 100 infra.
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Article Four
This article engages the somewhat diminished task of speci-
fying what assets enter the conventional community. Paragraph
One follows the legal regime by stating that things acquired
during marriage with community funds or in exchange for com-
munity assets shall enter the community. 47 Paragraph Two is
designed to be read in conjunction with Article Three, Paragraph
Eight of this contract. Both clauses stipulate that the character
of things obtained during marriage with a combination of sepa-
rate and community assets, where the separate and community
assets each constitute at least 25% of the cost of acquisition, is
determined by the intention of the spouses, subject only to an
obligation of reimbursement. This procedure will allow the
spouses some control over the characterization of assets acquired
during marriage, which is impossible presently since the thing
acquired is automatically presumed a community asset.48 No
change from the legal regime is made in the provision in Para-
graph Three that the wages or salaries of both spouses are com-
munity assets where the spouses are living together.49 Likewise,
there is no departure in Paragraph Four stating that the fruits
and revenues of community assets are community assets;50 or in
Paragraph Five, which specifies that donations made to the
spouses jointly are community assets."' Paragraph Six provides
that income, royalties, and revenues from intellectual assets enter
the community of gains.5 2 This was thought to be a necessary
47. Although not expressly stated in this way, this principle is implicit
In LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2402 and 2334. Article 2402 provides that property ac-
quired during marriage is community property, while article 2334 states
that if the property is acquired, with separate funds, it is separate property.
See also note 36 supra.
48. See note 41 supra.
49. See Peltier v. Begovich, 239 La. 238, 249-50, 118 So.2d 395, 399 (1960):
"Likewise earnings of the husband, whether living with his wife or not fall
Into the community." The wife's earnings are community if she is living
with her husband. Brownfleld v. Southern Amusement Co., 196 La. 73, 198
So. 656 (1940); Houghton v. Hall, 177 La. 238, 148 So. 37 (1933); Morace v.
Morace, 220 So.2d 775, 778 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 254 La. 287,
223 So.2d 410 (1969); Alexius Bros. & Co. v. Brock, 58 So.2d 279 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1952); Drewett v. Carnahan, 183 So. 103 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938).
50. Messersmith v. Messersmith, 229 La. 495, 86 So.2d 169 (1956); Daigre
v. Daigre, 228 La. 682, 83 So.2d 900 (1955); Succession of Hemenway, 228 La.
573, 83 So.2d 377 (1955).
51. See Succession of Land, 212 La. 103, 31 So.2d 609 (1947); Brewer v.
Hill, 178 La. 533, 152 So. 75 (1933), cert. denied, 292 U.S. 626 (1934); Burns v.
DeBakey, 186 So. 374 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1939).
52. Although no Louisiana decisions have considered the character of
Income, royalties, or revenues from intellectual property, royalties from min-
eral leases granted on the separate property of one of the spouses have been
held to fall into the community, since they were said to be in the nature of
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corollary to the classification of intellectual assets as separate
assets, since in some instances the spouses might be wholly de-
pendent upon income from such intellectual assets for their
livelihood.
Article Five
This article regulates life insurance under the conventional
community by drawing a basic distinction, all too often ignored
in Louisiana decisions, between policy rights-which include such
rights as the right to the cash surrender value, the right to
borrow on the policy, and the right to receive dividends and
proceeds rights-which become exigible only upon the death of
the insured. 58 Paragraph One specifically classifies policy rights
as separate assets. If the insured has designated the other spouse
revocable beneficiary, the policy rights are separate assets of the
insured; if the insured has relinquished the policy rights by desig-
nating the other spouse irrevocable beneficiary or by assigning
the policy to the other spouse, 54 the policy rights are separate
assets of the beneficiary or assignee. Under the legal community,
the character of the policy is determined at the time of its in-
ception. If the policy is taken out before marriage, the policy
rights are separate assets of the insured, if the designation of
beneficiary is revocable; whereas, they are separate assets of
the beneficiary, if the designation is irrevocable. 55 However, if
rents or civil fruits. Milling v. Collector of Revenue, 220 La. 773, 57 So.2d
679 (1952); Lagle v. Marchand's Estate, 129 So.2d 849 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1961).
53. This distinction between policy rights and proceeds rights has been
pointed out as a necessary one for an orderly consideration of life insurance
under traditional principles of community property law. See Benjamin and
Pigman, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation of Louisiana Life Insurance:
Part II, 28 TUL. L. REV. 243, 253 (1954); Comment, 25 LA. L. REV. 492, 493
(1965).
54. The irrevocable designation of a beneficiary has generally been
thought to be sufficient to transfer the policy rights to the irrevocable bene-
ficiary. See Benjamin and Pigman, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation of
Louisiana Life Insurance: Part II, 28 TUL. L. REV. 243, 256-61 (1954); Com-
ment, 40 TUL. L. REV. 131, 146 (1965). However, it has recently been pointed
out that designation of an irrevocable beneficiary may, under some policies,
leave some policy rights with the insured. In such a case, only an assignment
of the policy to the beneficiary is said to be sufficient to accomplish this
result. See Comment, 16 LOYOLA L. REV. 415 (1969-70); see also Oppenheim, The
Donation Inter Vives, 43 TUL. L. REv. 731, 737-38, 744-46 (1969).
55. Succession of Verneuille, 120 La. 605, 45 So. 520 (1908); Succession of
Barr, 219 So.2d 817, 821 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 254 La. 5, 222
So.2d 64 (1969). See also Benjamin and Pigman, Federal Estate and Gift
Taxation of Louisiana Life Insurance: Part II, 28 TUL. L. REV. 243, 260 (1954);
Comment, 25 LA. L. REV. 492, 494 (1965); Comment, 17 LA. L. Rv. 810, 811
(1957).
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the policy is issued during marriage, the policy rights are com-
munity assets.56
Under these principles governing the legal community, if the
community is dissolved prior to death, the policy rights which
are community assets, must be valued and divided w The difficul-
ties inherent in this procedure do not exist under Article Five
of this contract which classifies policy rights as separate assets
of one of the spouses under all circumstances. The one-half com-
munity interest of the spouse not entitled to the policy rights
is protected, where the community is terminated prior to death,
by the requirement of reimbursing that spouse half the value
of community assets used to support the policy. This right to re-
imbursement has been extended to the situation where the spouse
possessed of the policy rights converts them during marriage to
his or her personal benefit, e.g., by receiving the cash surrender
value. In both instances reimbursement is essential to prevent
that spouse from converting to his separate patrimony the other
spouse's half interest in community assets used to support the
policy.
The writer acknowledges that the characterization of policy
rights as separate assets invites adverse estate tax consequences
as to an insured who retains the policy rights as separate assets.
Where policy rights are classified as belonging to the community,
half the value of the proceeds of the policy are included in the
succession of the deceased insured spouse for estate tax purposes.
But where policy rights are classified as separate assets of the
56. Berry v. Franklin State Bank and Trust Co., 186 La. 623, 173 So. 126
(1937); Pollock v. Pollock, 164 La. 1077, 115 So. 275 (1928); Succession of
Buddig, 108 La. 406, 32 So. 361 (1902); Estate of Moseman, 38 La. Ann. 219
(1886); Succession of Butler, 147 So.2d 684 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962). See also
Benjamin and Pigman, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation of Louisiana Life
Insurance: Part II, 28 TUL. L. REV. 243, 261 (1954); Cahn, Louisiana Civil Law
as Applied to Life Insurance, 12 LA. L. REv. 56, 63 (1951); Comment, 25
LA. L. REV. 492, 494-97 (1965); Comment, 40 TUL. L. REv. 131, 141-42 (1965).
57. Numerous theories of an equitable method of division have been sug-
gested. See, e.g., Nabors, Civil Law Influences Upon the Law of Insurance
in Louisiana-Life Insurance Problems under the Community Property
System, 6 TUL, L. REv. 515, 533 (1932); Comment, 25 LA. L. REv. 492, 503 (1965);
Note, 12 TUL. L. REv. 156, 157-58 (1937). But see Cahn, Louisiana Civil Law as
Applied to Life Insurance, 12 LA. L. REv. 56, 63 (1951), wherein the writer
has concluded that the cash surrender value would belong to the owner of
the policy as a separate asset, subject to accountability for half the value
of premiums paid with community assets. This position accords with the
result reached under this contract.
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insured, the entire proceeds of the policy are included in the suc-
cession of the insured.58 Nonetheless, it is believed that the ad-
verse estate tax consequences are outweighed by the value of
having an efficient and manageable procedure for disposing of
life insurance policies when the community is dissolved prior
to death, especially in this age of rising marital instability. Under
this contract, an insured may still avoid any estate tax liability
by relinquishing all incidences of ownership in the policy, i.e.,
by completely disposing of all policy rights. Differing views exist
as to how this may be accomplished. The generally accepted view
is that it suffices to designate the other spouse as irrevocable
beneficiary and to cancel any reverter clauses which might re-
turn policy rights to the insured should the beneficiary pre-
decease him.5 9 However, this method has been criticized as in-
effective and it has been suggested that only an assignment of
the policy effects an abandonment of all policy rights.w
The decisions interpreting the legal community appear to
have held, in regard to the proceeds of a life insurance policy,
that if the policy is taken out by the husband, either before or
during marriage, and made payable to the wife, the proceeds
are her separate assets. Furthermore, she owes no obligation to
reimburse the succession of her husband half the value of com-
munity funds used to support the policy; he is held to have
intended a donation of this amount to her. 1 If the wife procures
a policy payable to her husband, it has been suggested that he
receives the proceeds as separate assets, but that he may have
to reimburse the succession of the wife half the value of com-
58. See Benjamin and Pigman, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation of
Louisiana Life Insurance: Part II, 28 TuL. L. REv. 248 (1954); Comment, 40
TUL. L. REV. 131 (1965).
59. Catalano v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D. La. 1968), affd in
part and rev'd in part, 429 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1969). See also Benjamin and
Pigman, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation of Louisiana Life Insurance:
Part II, 28 TUL. L. REV. 243 (1954); Comment, 40 TUL. L. REV. 131, 146 (1965).
See also Oppenheim, The Donation Inter Vivos, 43 TUL. T. REv. 731, 744-46
(1969), in which the decision in Catalano was approved.
60. See Comment, 16 LoYoLA L. REV. 415 (1969-70).
61. Douglass v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 150 La. 519, 530, 90 So.
834, 839 (1922); Succession of LeBlanc, 142 La. 27, 76 So. 223 (1917); Kelly
v. Kelly, 131 La. 1024, 1031, 60 So. 671, 674 (1913); Succession of Buddig,
108 La. 406, 407, 32 So. 361, 362 (1902); Estate of Moseman, 38 La. Ann. 219,
222 (1886); Succession of Bofenschen, 29 La. Ann. 711, 715 (1877). See also
Benjamin and Pigman, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation of Louisiana Life
Insurance: Part II, 28 TUL. L. REV. 243, 266-67 (1954); Cahn, Louisiana Civil
Law as Applied to Life Insurance, 12 LA. . REV. 56, 57-58, 60-61 (1951); Com-
ment, 25 LA. L. REv. 492, 500 (1965).
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munity funds used to pay premiums.62 Earlier decisions which
held that a contract of insurance taken out during marriage pro-
duced community proceeds0 3 appear to have antedated the now
accepted notion that the right to change the beneficiary can be
reserved, with the attendant severance of policy rights and pro-
ceeds rights.64 Consequently, those decisions simply classified
both policy rights and proceeds rights as community assets,
whereas the current understanding is that only the policy rights
fall into the legal community.
Paragraph Two is in accord with current principles in that
it states that where one spouse insures his or her own life and
names the other spouse beneficiary, either revocably or irre-
vocably, the proceeds are separate assets of the beneficiary
spouse, whether the contract was made before or during mar-
riage. However, a change of great practical significance is in-
troduced in the provision that no obligation of reimbursement
shall be enforceable against the beneficiary as a consequence of
community assets having been used to support the policy, unless
during the marriage the spouse entitled to reimbursement ex-
presses an intent to avail himself or herself of that right.0 5
62. See Benjamin and Pigman, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation of Lou-
isiana Life Insurance: Part II, 28 TUL. L. REv. 243, 268 (1954); Comment, 25
LA. L. REV. 492, 500 (1965). Presumably, reimbursement is required because
the wife cannot be presumed to have donated to the husband her interest in
the community funds used to pay the premiums, since she has no power to
donate community property.
63. Succession of Desforges, 135 La. 49, 58-60, 64 So. 978, 981-82 (1914);
Succession of Verneuille, 120 La. 605, 45 So. 520 (1908); Succession of Buddig,
108 La. 406, 32 So. 361 (1902); Estate of Moseman, 38 La. Ann. 219 (1886);
Pilcher v. New York Life Ins. Co., 33 La. Ann. 322, 324-25, 330 (1881); Suc-
cession of Kugler, 23 La. Ann. 455 (1871). See also Comment, 17 LA. L. REv.
810, 811 (1957).
64. See Benjamin and Pigman, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation of
Louisiana Life Insurance: Part I, 28 TUL. L. REv. 243, 256-57 (1954): "Lou-
isiana's insurance jurisprudence fails clearly to distinguish between the
owner's policy-rights and the beneficiary's proceeds-rights, which have been
freed from certain rules applicable to other Louisiana property interests.
The lack of an express distinction in the Louisiana jurisprudence between
policy-rights and proceeds-rights is at least partially due to the fact that
early Louisiana cases involved policies in which no right to change bene-
ficiaries was reserved. In cases involving these 'irrevocable-beneficiary' pol-
icies no distinction is necessary between policy-rights and proceeds-rights
since both are vested in an irrevocably-designated beneficiary. However the
few Louisiana decisions involving policy-rights in policies in which the right
to change beneficiaries is reserved have applied general Louisiana property
rules in determining whether the policy-rights inure to the benefit of the
marital community or the insured's separate estate."
65. This provision is weighted against reimbursement in the belief that
an insured spouse intends that, upon his or her death, the beneficiary spouse
COMMENTS
By subjecting this contractual obligation of reimbursement to a
suspensive condition" (the evidencing of intent during mar-
riage), Paragraph Two is intended to allow the option of reim-
bursement without violating the Civil Code prohibitions against
contracts between sponses. 6T The applicability of this option of re-
imbursement to both spouses displaces the fiction that the hus-
band intended a donation of his interest in community assets so
used to the wife.
Under the principles regulating the legal community, when
one spouse during marriage insures the life of the other spouse
in his own favor, the proceeds are held to be community assets,
because neither spouse is allowed to enrich his patrimony at the
expense of the community."" However, it has been recommended
that it is socially and economically desirable to allow the wife
to protect herself by insuring the life of her husband in her own
favor, with the proceeds payable to her as separate assets5 9 This
sound recommendation has been adopted by Paragraph Two and
extended to give the husband the same right to insure the life
of the wife in his own favor. Protection is afforded the insured's
half interest in community assets used to support the policy
through the option of requiring reimbursement. This procedure
should also yield the most favorable estate tax treatment for the
insured, since both policy rights and proceeds rights would norm-
ally belong to the beneficiary from the inception of the contract.
In dealing with the legal community, the courts have de-
cided that the husband has virtually unlimited power to assign
a policy insuring his life or to name a third person as beneficiary
of a policy on his life; no reimbursement is due by the husband
for his wife's half interest in community funds used to support
should receive the full proceeds, free from an obligation of reimbursement.
If reimbursement is intended, such intent need only be expressed.
6. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2043 defines the suspensive condition and explains its
effect: "The obligation contracted on a suspensive condition, is that which
demands, either on a future and uncertain event, or on an event which
has actually taken place, without its being yet known to the parties.
"In the former case, the obligation can not be executed till after the
event; in the latter, the obligation has its effect from the day on which it
was contracted, but it can not be enforced until the event be known."
67. See LA. Cir. CODE arts. 11, 12, 1790, 2446. See also Morrow, Matrimonial
Property Law in Louisiana, 34 TUL. L. Rzv. 3, 29 (1959).
68. See Benjamin and Pigman, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation of
Louisiana Life Insurance: Part 11, 28 TUL. L. REV. 243, 268 n. 272 (1954);
Comment, 25 LA. L. Rv. 492, 501 (1965).
69. See Comment, 25 LA. L. REv. 492, 501 (1965).
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the policy, unless he has acted in fraud of her rights.70 No change
is made in this rule.71
The decisions have held uniformly that proceeds of a policy
characterized as a separate asset of the insured and made pay-
able to his succession are separate assets subject to the re-
imbursement due the other spouse for half the value of com-
munity assets used to support the policy.72 Proceeds under a
policy characterized as a community asset and payable to the
the insured's succession are community assets.78 Insofar as Para-
graph Three provides that proceeds from all policies payable to
the insured's succession or to the legal representative of the
insured 74 shall be separate assets, it changes the above principles.
This difference is consistent with the rejection of the time of the
making of the insurance contract as the determinative factor as
to classification. The obligation of reimbursement imposed by this
paragraph will prevent any appropriation by the insured spouse
70. Sizeler v. Sizeler, 170 La. 128, 127 So. 388 (1930); Douglass v. Equitable
Life Assurance Soc., 150 La. 519, 90 So. 834 (1922); Morris v. Providential Life
& Accident Ins. Co., 162 So. 443, 444-45 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1935). See also
Benjamin and Pigman, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation of Louisiana Life
Insurance: Part II, 28 TUL. L. REV. 243, 268 (1954); Comment, 25 LA. L. REv.
492, 498 (1965); Note, 12 TUL. L. REV. 156 (1937). In Cahn, Louisiana Civil Law
as Applied to Life Insurance, 12 LA. L. REv. 56, 61 (1951), the opinion was
expressed that the husband's succession might be accountable to the wife
for half the value of community funds used to pay premiums where a third
person is named beneficiary, because this would be construed as a donation
to her detriment. This view is unacceptable, however, in that it fails to
appreciate that the burden of proof upon the wife is one of showing fraud.
71. Under Article Five, Paragraph One of this contract, policy rights are
always separate assets, and the husband can freely dispose of a policy on
his life; no reimbursement is due the wife for half the value of community
funds used to pay the premiums on the policy because Article Ten grants
the husband the power to make manual gifts of corporeal movables char-
acterized as community assets without the consent of the wife.
72. Thigpen v. Thigpen, 231 La. 206, 91 So.2d 12 (1956); Succession of
Lewis, 192 La. 734, 740, 189 So. 118, 120 (1939); Succession of Verneuille,
120 La. 605, 609, 45 So. 520, 522 (1908); Estate of Moseman, 38 La. Ann. 219
(1886); Succession of Butler, 147 So.2d 684, 686 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962). See
also Cahn, Louisiana Civil Law as Applied to Life Insurance, 12 LA. L. REv.
56, 59 (1951); Comment, 17 LA. L. REV. 810, 813 (1957).
73. Thigpen v. Thigpen, 231 La. 206, 91 So.2d 12 (1956); Messersmith
v. Messersmith, 229 La. 495, 86 So.2d 169 (1956); Succession of Farrell, 200
La. 29, 35, 7 So.2d 605, 606 (1942); Berry v. Franklin Bank & Trust Co., 186
La. 623, 173 So. 126 (1937); Succession of LeBlanc, 142 La. 27, 33, 76 So. 223,
225 (1917); Succession of Buddig, 108 La. 406, 408, 32 So. 361, 362 (1902). See
also Cahn, Louisiana Civil Law as Applied to Life Insurance, 12 LA. L. REv.
56, 59 (1951); Comment, 25 LA. L. REV. 492, 501 (1965).
74. "Legal Representative" as used here has the meaning given it in LA.
CODE CIv. P. art, 5251 (10): "'Legal representative' includes an administrator,
provisional administrator, administrator of a vacant succession, executor,
dative testamentary executor, tutor, administrator of the estate of a minor
child, curator, receiver, liquidator, trustee, and any offer appointed by a
court to administer an estate under its jurisdiction."
COMMENTS
of the half interest of the other spouse in community assets used
in support of the policy.
Article Six
This Article seeks to achieve uniformity in the various rules
as to annuities, disability payments, workman's compensation
benefits, unemployment compensation, retirement benefits, and
pensions in a manner not only beneficial to the spouses, but more
workable in practice.
The courts have applied the life insurance rules to annuities.
Where the annuity is contracted during marriage, benefits re-
ceived under it are community assets; if contracted prior to
marriage the benefits are separate assets.7 The writer has de-
parted from these rules in favor of classifying annuity benefits
received during marriage as community assets, whether the con-
tract was taken out before or during marriage. 6 Recognition has
been accorded the nature of these periodic payments as a sub-
stitute for or as a supplement to wages or earnings. Since under
Article Four, Paragraph Three of this contract wages and earn-
ings of each spouse fall into the community if the spouses are
living together, the identical treatment is given these payments.
The right to receive the benefits, as distinguished from the bene-
fits themselves, is a separate asset of the receiving spouse, and
upon dissolution of the community, that spouse retains this right
and is entitled to receive all future benefits. Consequently, it is
considered imperative, when the community is terminated prior
to death, that the recipient spouse reimburse the other spouse
half the value of community assets used in acquiring the right
to the benefits to the extent that that spouse's community half
interest in benefits already received has not been sufficient for
this purpose. If reimbursement were not required, the receiving
spouse could convert the other spouse's half interest to his own
personal benefit; he alone would participate in any benefits re-
ceived after dissolution of the community. This obligation of
75. Messersmith v. Messersmith, 229 La. 495, 510, 86 So.2d 169, 174 (1956);
Succession of Videau, 197 So.2d 655, 663 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
250 La. 920, 199 So.2d 922 (1967). See aZso Comment, 25 IA. L. REV. 492, 508(1965); Comment, 17 LA. L. REV. 810, 811 (1957).
76. Since all benefits received during marriage by virtue of an annuity
contract are community assets, the amount of the cash surrender value
of the contract, if received by the annuitant during the marriage, is likewise
community property. For cases recognizing the cash surrender value of an
annuity contract, see Succession of Pedrick, 207 La. 640, 21 So.2d 859 (1945);
Succession of Rabouin, 201 La. 227, 9 So.2d 529 (1942).
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reimbursement is not due where the community is dissolved by
death, unless during marriage the spouse entitled to reimburse-
ment expressed an intent to take advantage of this right.77
When faced with the issue of the status of disability pay-
ments received during marriage, from an insurance policy taken
out prior to marriage, the Supreme Court of Louisiana rejected
the life insurance rule and announced that disability payments
received during marriage are community assets, even if the
policy providing the benefits was taken out prior to marriage. 78
One writer has suggested that underlying this holding was the
desire to accord community status to funds replacing the lost
wages of the injured spouse.79 The treatment by Article Six of
all such payments as substitutes for or as supplements to wages
or salary is consistent with this analysis.
In a somewhat ambiguous decision, the Supreme Court of
Louisiana indicated that workman's compensation benefits re-
ceived by an injured wife during the existence of the community
are her separate assets. The court apparently reasoned that a
separate right of action was granted the wife by the workman's
compensation statute.8 0 This result is at variance with the ra-
tionale of the disability decisions, and the explanation has been
urged that the court might have been drawing an analogy to
the separate status of the wife's claim for damages under the
legal regime.8 ' It has been predicted that on the next occasion
the court will view workman's compensation benefits as a re-
placement for wages and, therefore, as community assets.8 2 The
77. This provision could be of importance not only where the commuted
value of the annuity contract is paid to the estate of the deceased annuitant,
but also where the other spouse receives it as beneficiary under a refund
annuity contract. In both instances Article Six makes the amount received
a separate asset, since the community has been dissolved by death; but,
reimbursement might be in order since the right to the death benefits was
a contractual one in existence during the marriage. For treatment of refund
annuity contracts, see Succession of Pedrick, 207 La. 640, 21 So.2d 859 (1945);
Succession of Rabouin, 201 La. 227, 9 So.2d 529 (1942). See also Cahn, Lou-
isiana Civil Law as Applied to Life Insurance, 12 LA. L. REv. 56, 68-69 (1951),
wherein it is suggested that the commuted value might be considered a
community asset under the legal regime.
78. Succession of Scott, 231 La. 381, 91 So.2d 574 (1956); Easterling v.
Succession of Lamkin, 211 La. 1089, 1097-98, 31 So.2d 220, 223 (1947).
79. See Comment, 17 LA. L. REV. 810, 817 (1957).
80. Brownfield v. Southern Amusement Co., 196 La. 73, 198 So. 656 (1940).
81. See Comment, 25 LA. L. REv. 108, 143 (1964); See also Morrow, Matri-
monial Property Law in Louisiana, 34 TUL. L. REv. 3, 45 (1959), in which It
is suggested that the court was influenced by the fact that in a variety of
situations the wife's income is separate property.
82. See Morrow, Matrimonial Property Law in Louisiana, 34 TUL. L. REv.
3, 45 (1959); Comment, 25 LA. L. REv. 108, 143 (1964); Comment, 17 LA. L. Ruv.
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result of this decision is changed by Article Six. Under that
Article only the right granted by the workman's compensation
statute is a separate asset; the benefits actually received during
marriage while the spouses are living together enter the com-
munity of gains. This contract would work no change in one
writer's observation that death benefits under the statute would
be the separate property of the recipient, since the right to
those benefits only accrues at the death of one spouse-an event
which ends the community. 8 8
No decisions were found dealing with unemployment com-
pensation. Nonetheless, since unemployment compensation is in-
tended as a substitute for wages, it should be included in the
community when the unemployment occurs during marriage.8
4
This result is reached under Article Six.
Retirement benefits have been held, in the context of a
Teachers' Retirement Fund, to be separate assets of the spouse
entitled to receive them.8 5 This result was based upon the non-
assignability provisions of the statute providing the benefits.
Although the result is a variance with Article Six, it need not
be, since this article classifies only the right to the proceeds as
a separate asset and characterizes benefits actually received dur-
ing marriage as community assets. Likewise, this method of
characterization should avoid any conflict with either federal or
state restrictions controlling the right to receive benefits under
a federal or state statutory scheme.86
With regard to pensions, the general rule seems to be that
where the services which warrant the pension are rendered
wholly before marriage, the pension is a separate asset of the
810, 817-19 (1957). see also Barr v. Davis Bros. Lumber Co., 183 La, 1013, 1023,
165 So. 185, 188 (1935), in which it was held that the object of the workman's
compensation statute is to offer a substitute for wages.
83. See Comment, 25 LA. L. REv. 108, 143 (1964); Comment, 17 LA. L. REV.
810, 819 (1957). See note 77 supra and note 91 infra, which explain that where
community assets are used to support an annuity or retirement contract
containing a contractual right to death benefits, reimbursement might be in
order. The right to workman's compensation death benefits arises only at
the death of one of the spouses, which event terminates the community of
gains. Hence, no question of reimbursement is involved.
84. See Comment, 17 LA. L. REv. 810, 819 (1957).
85. Broyles v. Broyles, 215 So.2d 526, 529 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968); Scott
v. Scott, 179 So.2d 656 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
86. In addition to the examples of the workman's compensation statute
and the Teachers' Retirement Fund, a good discussion of potential conflicts
with federal regulations as to federally supported pension plans is found
in Comment, 25 LA. L. Rav. 108, 141-42 (1964).
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pensioner;8 7 if the services are rendered during marriage, the
pension is a community asset.8 8 If the services begin prior to
marriage and continue into marriage, and the pension becomes
payable during marriage, the status of the property is not clear.
The presumption of community might make the whole amount a
community asset, although it has been urged that it would be
desirable to let the pensioner preserve as a separate asset the
percentage of the pension representing the time for which ser-
vices were rendered prior to marriage.8 9 Article Six abandons
reliance on the time of the rendition of the services in favor of
providing that pension benefits received during marriage while
the spouses are living together are community assets, regardless
of when the services are rendered.
When the legal community is terminated prior to death
and before the accrual of the pension right, and if the pension
right is certain without the necessity of other services, it must
be valued and divided with the other assets of the former com-
munity.2 This difficulty is avoided by Article Six, which stipu-
lates that only pension benefits actually received during mar-
riage while the spouses are living together are community assets;
the right to the benefits is a separate asset of the recipient
spouse. The other spouse is entitled to reimbursement for half
the value of community funds used to acquire the right to the
pension, to the extent that that spouse's half interest in pension
benefits already received has not equaled this amount. When
the community is terminated by death no obligation of reim-
bursement is enforceable, unless the spouse entitled to reimburse-
ment has, during marriage, expressed an intent to take advantage
of the right.9 '
Article Seven
No change was made in adopting the basic principle of the
87. See Succession of Lewis, 192 La. 734, 740, 189 So. 118, 120 (1939);
Howard v. Ingle, 180 So. 248 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938). See a~so Comment, 25
LA. L. REv. 108, 139 (1964).
88. Succession of Scott, 231 La. 382, 91 So.2d 574 (1956); Comment, 25
LA. L. REv. 108, 139 (1964).
89. Comment, 25 LA. L. Rev. 108, 140 (1964).
90. Id.
91. Although death benefits payable under a retirement system are
received under this contract as separate assets, since death has terminated
the community, an obligation of reimbursement might arise if the right to
the death benefits was a contractual one existing during the marriage. See
note 74 supra and Succession of Rockvoan, 141 So.2d 438, 440 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1962).
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legal regime that proceeds of property insurance acquire the
character of the property insured 2 The obligation of reimburse-
ment contained in Article Nine is available to facilitate a proper
accounting should community assets be used to insure a separate
asset or should separate assets be used to insure a community
asset.
Article Eight
Article Eight presents perhaps the most dramatic divergence
from the principles of the legal community. The courts of this
state have uniformly held that all things acquired during mar-
riage are presumed community assets,93 and the spouse seeking
to prove a separate character bears a heavy burden. 4 Likewise,
the Civil Code establishes a presumption that all effects which
the husband and wife reciprocally possess at the dissolution of
the marriage are community assets.9 5 Thus, where admittedly
community funds are commingled with admittedly separate
funds in a separate account, the entire balance is transformed
into community funds, unless the amount of community funds
is too insignificant to constitute commingling. 6 Such strictly en-
92. Thigpen v. Thigpen, 231 La. 206, 91 So.2d 12 (1956); Hall v. Tous-
saint, 52 La. Ann. 1763, 28 So. 304 (1900).
93. Smith v. Smith, 230 La. 509, 89 So.2d 55 (1956); Succession of Joseph,
180 So.2d 862, 864 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965); Succession of Marshall, 174 So.2d
234, 235 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 247 La. 1035, 175 So.2d 647
(1965); Vining v. Beatty, 161 So.2d 298 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964); Fleury v.
Fleury, 131 So.2d 355 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961); Butler v. Burks, 99 So.2d 180,
183 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1957).
94. The proof required has been stated in a variety of ways. It is said
that the presumption of community must be overcome by evidence which is
"strong, clear and convincing," Succession of Marshall, 174 So.2d 234, 237(La. App. 4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 247 La. 1035, 175 So.2d 647 (1965);
"only by evidence of the clearest character," Humble Oil and Ref. Co. v.
Lewis, 150 So.2d 796, 800 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963), aff'd, 245 La. 499, 159 So.2d
132 (1963); by proof which is "clear, positive, and of a legally certain nature,"
Succession of Elrod v. LeNy, 218 So.2d 83, 87 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969); and
by proof which is "strict, clear, positive and legally certain," Fleury v.
Fleury, 131 So.2d 355, 357 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
95. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2405: "At the time of the dissolution of the marriage,
all effects which both husband and wife reciprocally possess, are presumed
common effects or gains, unless it be satisfactorily proved which of such
effects they brought in marriage, or which have been given them separately,
or which they have respectively inherited."
See Bruyninckx v. Woodward, 217 La. 736, 746, 47 So.2d 478, 481 (1950);
Succession of Ipser, 180 La. 656, 157 So. 380 (1934); Succession of Breaux,
38 La. Ann. 728 (1886); Babin v. Nolan, 6 Rob. 508 (La. 1844); Montegut v.
Trouart, 7 Mart, (O.S.) 361 (La. 1820). See also Morrow, Matrimonial Prop-
erty Law in Louisiana, 34 TUL. L. REV. 3, 15-17 (1959).
96. See Slater v. Culpepper, 233 La. 1071, 1096, 99 So.2d 348, 357 (1957);
Abraham v. Abraham, 230 La. 78, 92, 87 So.2d 735, 740 (1956); Succession of
Joseph, 180 So.2d 862, 865 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965); see also Comment, 25 LA. L.
REv. 108, 144 (1964); Note, 33 TUL. L. REv. 244 (1958), for a full discussion of
commingling.
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forced presumptions have been, in the writer's opinion, the
greatest obstacles to a more efficient settlement of the com-
munity of gains. Too often these presumptions are unresponsive
to the desires of the spouses, and too frequently they result in the
unintended loss of separate assets.97 It is suggested that substan-
tial justice would be better achieved by abolishing all presump-
tions and by subjecting, as does Article Eight, the classification
of all things to the same requirements of proof as any other fact
in a civil action, i.e., proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
Since the problem of characterization arises only when the status
of the property is put in issue, this article is couched in those
terms.
Article Nine
This article introduces major alterations in the Civil Code
rules concerning the accounting between the spouses at the
termination of the community of gains. These rules provide
basically that where separate assets of one spouse are enhanced
in value by common labor, funds, or industry, the other spouse
is entitled to reimbursement of half the increased value, pro-
vided the enhancement did not result in the ordinary course of
events or due to a normal rise in value or to the chances of
trade.98 Likewise, where community assets are enhanced by the
97. This difficulty was pointed out in Huie, Separate Claims To Reim-
bursement From community Property In Louisiana, 27 TUL. L. REv. 143, 160-
61 (1953):
"The evidence available at the dissolution of the marriage, when claims
for reimbursement are commonly asserted, is often so fragmentary that it
is hard to establish even the bare fact of ownership of separate funds at one
time during the existence of the community....
"Only by education can litigation ... be avoided. Married couples and
those contemplating marriage must be taught what evidence to preserve and
how to preserve it. Until it becomes a common practice to prepare and
preserve reliable documentary evidence of at least the original separate
assets and liabilities of each of the partners to the marital partnership, the
separate estates of the spouses will continue to disappear into the com-
munity at a rapid rate .. "
98. LA. Civ. COD art. 2408: "When the separate property of either the
husband or the wife has been increased or improved during the marriage,
the other spouse, or his or her heirs, shall be entitled to the reward of one
half of the value of the increase or ameliorations, if it be proved that the
increase or ameliorations be the result of the common labor, expenses or
industry; but there shall be no reward due, if it be proved that the increase
is due only to the ordinary course of things, to the rise in the value of prop-
erty, or to the chances of trade."
Abunza v. Olivier, 230 La. 445, 458, 88 So.2d 815, 820 (1956); Abraham
v. Abraham, 230 La. 78, 86, 87 So.2d 735, 738 (1956); Hayward v. Carraway,
180 So.2d 758, 767 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 248 La. 909, 182
So. 2d 662 (1966); Succession of Sonnier, 208 So.2d 562, 567 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1968); Christentery v. Chrisentery, 124 So.2d 426 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960).
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separate funds of one spouse, that spouse is entitled to re-
imbursement of half the increased value.99 Article Nine changes
the measure of reimbursement from half the enhanced value,
which treats reimbursement as a return on an investment, to the
amount of the assets used, which treats reimbursement as the
repayment of a loan.100 By confining the inquiry to the amount
of the funds expended, much of the difficulty in measuring the
elusive dimensions of "enhanced value"''1 will be circumvented.
In line with this effort toward a more manageable accounting
procedure, Article Nine denies reimbursement for labor expended
by either spouse on separate assets of either spouse, regardless
of whether the separate assets are enhanced in value. Under
the legal community, the labor of each spouse alone is held to be
community labor, 102 and reimbursement of half the enhanced
value of the separate asset is required. The writer submits that
the labor of a spouse is compensated adequately by payment of
wages or a salary, which falls into the community if the spouses
are living together. 03 No change is made in the settled principle
that where separate assets of one spouse are used to satisfy an
obligation chargeable, as between the spouses, to the community
assets, that spouse is entitled to reimbursement from the other
99. See Pennison v. Pennison, 157 So.2d 628 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 245 La. 585, 159 So.2d 290 (1964.)
100. It should be noted that, at an earlier date, the amount of the funds
expended was accepted as the measure of reimbursement. See Succession of
McClelland, 14 La. Ann. 762 (1859); Depas v. Riez, 2 La. Ann. 30 (1847).
101. See In re Succession of Rusciana, 136 So.2d 509, 511 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1961), in which the court stated that four elements had to be proved
in order to establish enhanced value: "A husband or wife claiming entitle-
ment to one-half of the enhanced value of the other's separate estate because
of alleged increased value thereof resulting from their joint effort and in-
dustry during the marriage bears the burden of proving; (1) the Improve-
ments so made did in fact enhance the value of the separate property of
the other; (2) such improvements were made with community funds or re-
sulted from their joint industry, expense or labor; (3) the value of the
separate property of the other spouse at the commencement and dissolution
of the community (so that the enhanced value may be determined); and
(4) that the enhancement did not result in the ordinary course of events or
due to the property's normal rise in value or the chance of trade." Accord,
Chrisentery v. Chrisentery, 124 So.2d 426 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960). See also
Comment, 37 TUL. L. Rv. 506, 522 (1963).
102. For holdings which define "common labor," see Abraham v. Abra-
ham, 230 La. 78, 87 So.2d 735 (1956) and Guillory v. Desormeaux, 166 So.2d
575, 578 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964). See also Comment, 37 TUL. L. REv. 506, 514,
520 (1963).
103. See, e.g., Beals v. Fontenot, 111 F.2d 956, 960 (5th Cir. 1940), in
which the husband owned stock, as his separate property, in a corporation
of which he was an officer. The wife argued that the Increase In value of the
separate stock was due to community labor. The court held that the increase
In value belonged entirely to the husband, since the community had been
adequately compensated by the salary paid the husband.
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spouse of half the value of separate assets contributed. 0 4 Where
community assets are used to pay an obligation chargeable, as
between the spouses, to a spouse's separate assets, that spouse
is bound to reimburse the other spouse half the value of com-
munity assets used. 0 5 The preface of Article Nine, "Except as
otherwise provided by this contract," refers to the options con-
tained in Articles Five and Six relative to requiring enforcement
of the obligation of reimbursement.
Article Ten
This article tracks Civil Code article 2404106 in that it adopts
the concept that the husband is the head and master of the
conventional community; he alone can incur obligations charge-
able against it, and he has full administration and control of
its effects and disposes of its revenues. His power is limited,
just as it is under the legal regime, but several modifications are
introduced. Paragraph One incorporates both the Civil Code pro-
vision that the husband can dispose by onerous title of immov-
ables of the community, and the exception that where the prop-
erty stands in the name of the wife her written consent is neces-
sary.10 7 But it rejects the Civil Code provision that where title
to immovables stands in the names of both husband and wife,
the wife may file a declaration by authentic act that her written
consent is required. 0 8 A major change is made by Paragraph
104. Succession of Brownlee, 44 La. Ann. 917, 921, 11 So. 590, 592 (1892);
Heirs of Gee v. Thompson, 41 La. Ann. 348, 352, 6 So. 548, 549 (1889); Succes-
sion of Foreman, 38 La. Ann. 700 (1886); Moore v. Stancel, 36 La. Ann. 819
(1884); Den~gre v. Den~gre, 30 La. Ann 275 (1878); Glasscock v. Green, 4
La. Ann. 146 (1849).
105. Succession of Brownlee, 44 La. Ann. 917, 921, 11 So. 590, 592 (1892);
Childers v. Johnson, 6 La. Ann. 634 (1851); Glenn v. Elam, 3 La. Ann. 611
(1848).
106. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2404 reads in part as follows: "The husband is
the head and master of the partnership or community of gains; he ad-
ministers its effects, disposes of the revenues which they produce, and may
alienate them by onerous title, without the consent and permission of his
wife."
107. Id. See also ]LA. Cry. CODE art. 2334, which reads in part as follows:
"But when the title to community property stands in the name of the wife,
it cannot be mortgaged or sold by the husband without her written authority
or consent."
108. LA. Cv. CODE art. 2334: "Where the title to immovable property
stands in the names of both the husband and wife, it may not be leased,
mortgaged or sold by the husband without the wife's written authority or
consent where she has made a declaration by authentic act that her au-
thority and consent are required for such lease, sale or mortgage and has
filed such declaration in the mortgage and conveyance records of the parish
in which the property is situated." See also LA. R.S. 9:2801-04 (1950),
which allow the wife to make and record a declaration that certain prop-
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Two, which stipulates that the husband can make no inter vivos
gratuitous disposition of the immovables or incorporeal mov-
ables'" of the community without the consent of the wife. Under
the legal regime, he cannot make a gratuitous disposition of the
immovables or of the whole or a quota of the movables, unless
it be for the establishment of the children of the marriage; but
he can dispose of the community movables by a gratuitous and
particular title for the benefit of all persons.110 The concurrence
of the wife is urged as a reasonable requirement in the two
instances mentioned in Paragraph Two."' Furthermore, as to the
donation of incorporeal movables, it is considered a necessary
concomitant of the transformation of the form of wealth in our
society from primarily immovable to predominantly movable."12
erty is the "family home," in which case the property cannot be alienated
without her consent, and LA. CONST. art. XI, § 3, which provides that waivers
of homestead exemptions are to be signed by both spouses.
109. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 460, 461, 470, 474, 475, which define the nature
of incorporeal movables.
110. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2404, which reads in part: "He can make no
conveyance inter vivos, by a gratuitous title, of the immovables of the
community, nor of the whole, or of a quota of the movables, unless it be for
the establishment of the children of the marriage.
"Nevertheless he may dispose of the movable effects by a gratuitous and
particular title, to the benefit of all persons."
See Oliphant v. Oliphant, 219 La. 781, 54 So.2d 18 (1951), which defines
a "quota of the movables" to mean a fraction or a percentage.
111. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 1536 and 1538 subject donations of immovables
and of incorporeal movables to the stringent form of an authentic act. It is
suggested that it Is not an unreasonable demand to require that the wife
consent to any donation of community immovables or community incorporeal
movables. Corporeal movables could still be donated by authentic act (art.
1538) or by manual gift (art. 1539) without the consent of the wife. Where
the consent of the wife is required, she would bear an easier burden in
attacking dispositions intentionally made by the husband to her detriment,
for in the final accounting between the spouses she need only show that
her consent was not secured and that she had not ratified the act. This
burden is considerably lighter than that imposed by an allegation of fraud,
which is the only recourse available to the wife where her consent Is not
required.
In several areas, later legislation has superseded these Civil Code provi-
sions as to the form of donations. LA. R.S. 1521 (1958) provides that these
Civil Code requirements are not applicable to insurance policies, and a recent
decision has held that the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, LA. R.S. 12:621-43
(1968), supersedes the Civil Code rules on the form of donations. See Suc-
cession of Hall, 198 So.2d 511, 514 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
250 La. 974, 200 So.2d 664 (1967). See generally Oppenheim, The Donation
Inter Vivos, 43 TUL. L. REv. 731 (1969).
112. See es-pecaly Succession of Geagan, 212 La. 574, 599-600, 33 So.2d
118, 126 (1947), in which the wife claimed the decedent donated the com-
munity stock to his son in fraud of her rights. The court stated: "In our
opinion the wife should not have to prove fraud and injury in order to set
aside gratuitous dispositions of valuable movable property. In modern times,
when movable property may and often does constitute the great bulk of the
wealth, the husband should have no more right to dispose of movables
gratuitously without the consent of his wife than he has to dispose of im-
movables. It appears to be a matter of sufficient importance to warrant the
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Paragraph Three simply adopts the definition of "gratuitous
title" found in the Civil Code; 113 Paragraph Four grants the wife
a cause of action against the husband or his heirs at the termina-
tion of the community for the recovery of her interest when
the husband has made a disposition without her consent, where
required, or in fraud of her rights. 11 4 Paragraph Five is essential
to the continuous administration of the community, for it permits
the husband to administer the community assets without his
wife's consent, where required, and where she is an absentee or
is by reason of infirmity incapable of making an informed judg-
ment. This guarantees the husband full powers of administration
without having to be appointed his absent wife's curator, with
the attendant restrictions,"15 and without the necessity of having
his wife interdicted. 1 It also fills a hiatus in the law by its ap-
plication when the wife is committed to a mental institution but
is not interdicted.117
Article Eleven
Article Eleven accords with the rules governing the legal
Legislature's giving this provision of our law serious consideration." See
also the following observations made on the decision in Geagan, Comment,
33 TUL. L. REV. 811, 812 (1959): "One effect of this decision would be to
permit the husband to transform immovable community property into mov-
able property thereby escaping the strict limitation on donations of immov-
able community property. A deceitful husband, by inter vivos donation, might
thus defeat the wife's community Interest. At the least, he would have shifted
to the wife the burden of protecting her interest by proving his fraudulent
intent to injure her community Interest."
113. LA. CiV. CODs art. 2404, which reads in part as follows: "A gratuitous
title within the contemplation of this article embraces all titles wherein
there Is no direct, material advantage to the donor."
114. Id., which states in part: "But if it should be proved that the
husband has sold the common property, or otherwise disposed of the same
by fraud, to injure his wife, she may have her action against the heirs of
her husband in support to her claim in one-half of the property, on her satis-
factorily proving the fraud." This article allows the wife this action only
upon the termination of the community In support of her claim for her half
interest. In this respect it is consistent with LA. R.S. 9:291 (1950), which
provides that a wife may not sue her husband during marriage, except for
the three instances specified therein. See also note 108 supra which points
out the easier burden of proof Imposed upon the wife where the disposition
was made without her required consent.
115. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 47-55.
116. See LA. Civ. CODE arts. 389-426.
117. See Slovenko and Super, Commitment Procedure in Louisiana, 35
TUL. L. REv. 705, 719 (1961): "Under the Louisiana Mental Health Law[LA. R.S. 28:1-205 (1950)], commitment in Itself does not deprive the patient
of his civil rights, such as the right to make contracts and gifts. It is the
purpose of an incompetency proceeding (interdiction) to adjudge a person
Incompetent and to appoint a curator (guardian) to control his property
and administer his affairs. Commitment, while it Involves confinement in
an institution, does not in itself take from the patient the care and manage-
ment of his estate ... "
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community in providing that the wife's interest in each com-
munity asset is one of full ownership from the moment of
acquisition. This interest is subject to the administration and
control of the husband in the manner specified in Article Ten.118
The provision that the wife cannot act for or in the place of her
husband unless authorized by him is a recognition of the hus-
band's position as head and master of the community and is
consistent with the holdings of the Louisiana courts in regard
to the power of the wife to bind the legal community. 119 The
writer suggests, in addition to this, the possible existence of a
custom by which the wife binds her husband as the head of the
community. 120 In providing that the wife shall have full adminis-
tration of community assets in the continued absence of her
husband, or where because of infirmity he is himself incapable of
such administration, Article Eleven promotes uninterrupted con-
trol of community assets by relieving the wife of the necessity
of being appointed her absent husband's curator,121 or of having
her husband interdicted. 22 It also allows administration by the
wife where her husband is committed to a mental institution, but
is not interdicted.123 The authority of the wife in the absence
of her husband lasts until she is forced to elect whether to con-
tinue the community or to allow her husband's presumptive heirs
to be put into provisional possession of his estate. 24
Article Twelve
Article Twelve incorporates the basic language of Civil
Code article 2403125 in providing that debts incurred during mar-
riage are properly chargeable to the community assets, but a
118. Azar v. Azar, 239 La. 941, 946, 120 So.2d 485, 487 (1960); Thigpen v.
Thigpen, 231 La. 206, 226, 91 So.2d 12, 19 (1956); Commercial Credit Plan,
Inc. v. Perry, 186 So.2d 900 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 249 La.
709, 190 So.2d 231 (1966).
119. For a very full discussion of this entire area of community property
law, see Comment, 30 LA. L. REv. 441 (1970). See also Comment, 25 LA. L. REV.
201, 234-40 (1964). LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2985-3034 contain the rules applicable
to mandatories, and LA. CIV. CODE art. 1787 permits the wife to act as the
mandatory of her husband.
120. See LA. Civ. CODE arts. 3, 21, 1903, 1953, 1954, 1966; Comment, 30
LA. L. REV. 441, 446 (1970).
121. See note 115 supra.
122. See note 116 supra.
123. See note 117 supra.
124. See LA. Civ. CODE arts. 57-75, especially art. 64.
125. LA. Cv. CODE art. 2403: "In the same manner, the debts contracted
during the marriage enter into the partnership or community of gains, and
must be acquitted out of the common fund, whilst the debts of both husband
and wife, anterior to the marriage, must be acquitted out of their own per-
sonal and individual effects."
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fundamental departure is made from decisions interpreting that
Civil Code article as applying to third persons and as granting
community creditors preferential treatment in proceeding against
community assets.126 Article Twelve unequivocally explains that
the requirement of satisfying obligations incurred during mar-
riage out of community assets is only an accounting procedure
between husband and wife which in no way alters the recourse
of creditors against the spouse or spouses who personally in-
curred the obligation. This accounting principle is the basis for
the rules in Article Nine regarding reimbursement, which essen-
tially inquire as to whether an obligation was properly charge-
able to the community assets or separate assets out of which
it was satisfied. That these precepts were at one time understood
in Louisiana is illustrated by an early decision,'1 27 but since that
decision, these principles have been ignored. The reference to
obligations incurred by the husband, or by the wife acting for or
in the place of her husband is merely a recognition of the manner
in which obligations chargeable to the community assets may
be incurred.
Paragraph One includes a basic exception to the broad
language of Article Twelve by stipulating that obligations in-
curred in the interest of the separate assets of one spouse are
not to be imposed on both spouses, in the final accounting upon
dissolution of the community, by being charged against the com-
munity assets. Rather, they are to be satisfied, as between the
spouses, out of the separate assets of the spouse benefited.'1
Paragraph Two abolishes the judicially instituted rule that the
delicts of the wife are to be satisfied out of the community
assets if she was on a community mission at the time of the
injury.' 29 It provides uniformly that, as between the spouses,
126. Pennison v. Pennison, 250 La. 303, 195 So.2d 276 (1967); Thompson
v. Vance, 110 La. 26, 34 So. 112 (1903); Bourgeois v. Ducos, 182 So.2d 539
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1966). See also Comment, 25 LA. L. REV. 201, 224-26 (1964).
127. In Dickerman v. Reagan, 2 La. Ann. 440 (1847), the following was
said: "It is true, that debts contracted during the marriage enter into the
community of gains, and must be acquitted out of the common fund. C.C.
art. 2372 [article 2403, in the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870]. But this provi-
sion applies to the partners alone, and regulates their rights between them-
selves, upon a settlement of the community at its dissolution. It has no
application to creditors, and does not deprive them of their recourse against
the wife, during the marriage, for debts contracted for her separate advan-
tage, and for which she is individually liable." See also Comment, 30 LA. L.
REV. 441, 447-48 (1970).
128. See Comment, 25 LA. L. REV. 201, 202-03 (1964).
129. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Carter, 227 So.2d 616, 619 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1969); Bradford v. Brown, 199 So.2d 414 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
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liability for the delicts of either spouse is chargeable to that
spouse's separate assets.
Paragraph Three is an adaptation of several Civil Code
principles imposing personal liability on the wife for all' 30 or a
portion' 31 of the necessary expenses of the marriage. These ob-
ligations are recognized as being chargeable to the community
assets, but where the community assets are not sufficient to
satisfy these obligations, the separate assets of the spouses are
available for this purpose. This provision is the sole instance in
this contract in which reimbursement is not allowed for satisfac-
tion of obligations chargeable to community assets out of sepa-
rate assets. 3 2 As to third persons, this liability is personal and
solidary, 38 but as between the spouses, it is due in proportion to
the relative amount of the separate assets owned by each during
the period when the obligations are due. 8 4 Payment by either
spouse in excess of this proportionate liability gives rise to a
claim inter sese for reimbursement at the final accounting be-
tween the spouses. It should be noted that Paragraph Three
130. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2435, which applies where the wife has been
granted a separation of property during marriage, provides: "The wife, who
has obtained the separation of property, must contribute, in proportion to
her fortune and to that of her husband, both to the household expenses and
to those of the education of their children. She is bound to support those
expenses alone, if there remains nothing to her husband." See LA. Civ. CODE
arts. 2425-37 for the principles governing the separation of property.
131. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2389 governs where the wife has brought no dowry
into marriage, but has retained all of her property as paraphernal, or sepa-
rate, property. It states: "If all the property of the wife be paraphernal,
and she have reserved to herself the administration of it, she ought to bear
a proportion of the marriage charges, equal, if need be, to one half her
income." LA. CIv. CODE art. 2395 controls where the spouses have contracted
that there should be no community of property between them, but that they
should remain separate in property. It provides: "Each of the married
persons separate in property, contributes to the expenses of the marriage
in the manner agreed on by their contract; If there be no agreement on the
subject, the wife contributes to the amount of one-half of her income."
132. Huie, Separate Claims to Reimbursement from Community Prop-
erty in Louisiana, 27 TUL. L. REv. 143, 159 (1953).
133. Obligations in solido are governed by LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2077-2107.
134. The standard of liability established by LA. Civ. CODE art. 2435 has
been adopted in Article Twelve, Paragraph Three in that the liability of the
wife, vis-a-vis her husband, may extend to the whole of the obligations.
Third persons may proceed against either spouse for total satisfaction, with-
out regard to the proportionate liability between the spouses themselves,
which is a matter to be settled by the spouses through the principle of
reimbursement in the final accounting. But the spouses' liability inter sese
may be total. For example, if the husband has no separate assets, the wife's
proportionate liability is for the whole of these obligations. But see Hule,
Separate Claims to Reimbursement from Community Property In Louisiana,
27 TUL. L. Rsv. 143, 195 (1953), in which the writer urges rejection of the
standard contained in article 2435 where there Is a community of gains
between the spouses.
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avoids the multitude of phrases used in the Civil Code to de-
scribe the necessary expenses of the marriage, and, instead,
utilizes the concept of the "alimentary obligations" due between
the spouses'83 themselves or between the spouses and their legiti-
mate children.8 6 Alimentary obligations owed by one spouse to
his ascendants, 1' or to his illegitimate children'3 8 are to be
satisfied ultimately out of the separate assets of that spouse alone.
Consequently, these particular obligations are not mentioned in
Paragraph Three.
Article Thirteen
This article, in considering the liability of the spouses to
third persons, recognizes the accepted principle that community
obligations are to be satisfied by the husband, even out of his
separate assets.3 9 The wife is liable to third persons for com-
munity obligations only if she has made herself personally liable
for them.140 Article Thirteen also provides that antenuptual
creditors of the husband may proceed against him and against
the community assets during marrage for satisfaction; in this
respect it nullifies the result reached by the Supreme Court of
Louisiana in United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Green.'4 '
In making this departure, the writer is in full agreement with
135. See LA. Civ CODE arts. 119, 120, 230-34.
136. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 227-30.
137. LA. CIv. CODE art. 229.
138. See LA. Civ. CODE arts. 238-45.
139. Poindexter v. Louisiana & Ark. Ry., 170 La. 521, 128 So. 297 (1930);
Hawley v. Crescent City Bank, 26 La. Ann. 230 (1874); Succession of McLean,
12 La. Ann. 222 (1857); Hart v. Foley, 1 Rob. 378 (La. 1842); Beal v. Ward, 13
La. App. 191, 127 So. 423 (1930). See also Morrow, Matrimonial Property Law
in Louisiana, 34 TUL. L. REV. 3, 5 (1959); Comment, 30 LA. L. REV. 603, 607,
609, 614 (1970). Also, it has always been clear that the husband's separate
creditors may proceed against the community assets, while the separate
creditors of the wife cannot. See Huie, Separate Claims to Reimbursement
from Community Property in Louisiana, 27 TUL. L. REV. 143, 146 (1953);
Comment, 25 LA. L. REV. 201, 228-29 (1964), especially 229 n. 272.
140. Lobit & Charpentier v. Harman, 13 La. Ann. 593 (1858); Lambert v.
Franchebois, 16 La. 1 (1840); Smith v. Viser, 117 So.2d 673, 674 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1960); Brock Furniture Co. v. Carroll, 86 So.2d 715, 716 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1956); Cook-Douglas Co. v. Prudhomme, 13 La. App. 37, 38, 127 So. 104, 105(1930). See also Morrow, Matrimonial Property Law in Louisiana, 34 TUL. L.
REV. 3, 35 (1959); Comment, 25 LA. L. REV. 201-16, 219 (1964).
141. 252 La. 227, 234, 210 So.2d 328, 331 (1968). That decision held that
antenuptual creditors of the husband could not proceed against the com-
munity assets for satisfaction, and reversed prior decisions uniformly hold-
ing that Civil Code article 2403 is to be read with article 2404, which gives
the husband such broad powers in alienating the community assets that his
antenuptual creditors can proceed against the community assets. See, e.g.,
Fazzio v. Krieger, 226 La. 511, 76 So.2d 713 (1954); Heirs of Gee v. Thompson,
41 La. Ann. 348, 352, 6 So. 548, 549 (1889); Stafford v. Sumrall, 21 So.2d 83,
85 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1945).
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prior statements that Green is unsound and unduly harsh on
creditors.142 Of course, as between the spouses, the wife's half
interest in community assets is fully protected, since she is
entitled to reimbursement at the dissolution of the community.'4
The last clause of Article Thirteen imposes on the spouses
solidary liability to third persons for the alimentary obligations
specified in Article Twelve, Paragraph Three. The reason for this
last clause is simple. This marriage contract enables the spouses
to more easily acquire and maintain separate assets. Since
the husband has always had to satisfy community obligations
out of his separate assets, it would be manifestly unfair both
to the husband and to creditors of community obligations to
permit the wife to increase her separate assets at the expense
of the community and not be charged with sharing personal
responsibility with her husband for at least the most elementary
expenses of the marriage, where the community assets are in-
adequate.
Article Fourteen
This article adopts the basic scheme of the Civil Code for
the division of community assets and liabilities upon the dissolu-
tion of the community. The wife is entitled, by her uncondi-
tional acceptance of the community and resulting assumption of
personal liability for half the community obligations,'4 to share
142. See Note, 15 LOYOLA L. REv. 166 (1969); Note, 43 TUL. L. RBv. 376
(1969).
143. In this regard, see The Work of the Louisana Appellate Courts for
the 1968-1969 Term-Matrimonial Regimes, 30 LA. L. REV. 219, 220-21 (1969),
in which the writer points out, in his criticism of the Green decision, that
the Civil Code regulation of the community is an interspousal matter only,
which produces effects as to third persons only indirectly by altering the
patrimonies of the contracting parties. The wife's creditors cannot reach
the community assets because her interest in them vis-a-vis her husband Is
not part of her patrimony as far as they are concerned. The husband's
creditors may reach the community assets because they are part of his
patrimony, so far as they are concerned, whatever his interest in them vis-a-
vis the wife. As between the spouses, however, the wife does have a protect-
able interest in the community assets. See also Note, 29 LA. L. REv. 409
(1969). Both of the cited writers not only criticize the result reached in
Green, but also proclaim a misapplication of basic principles of matrimonial
regime law.
144. LA. CIrv. CODE art. 2409: "It is understood that, in the partition of the
effects of the partnership or community of gains, both husband and wife
are to be equally liable for their share of the debts contracted during the
marriage, and not acquitted at the time of its dissolution." The wife is
personally liable for half the community obligations not only to third persons,
but also to her husband, or to his heirs, if he or they are forced to pay all
of the community obligations. The husband, or his heirs are liable to third
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in half the community assets. 145 She avoids liability by renounc-
ing the community' 40-in which case she loses all rights to the
things which composed the former community' 47-or by accept-
ing with benefit of inventory-in which case she limits her
liability to half the value of the community assets.14 8 The provi-
sion that the wife is entitled of right and without the necessity
of furnishing security to half the community assets and to an
immediate partition of the same is inserted to remove all doubt
that the wife need not await the payment of community obliga-
tions before she can obtain a partition. This should avoid the
results of many Louisiana decisions which hold that the com-
munity is "fictitiously continued" under the administration of the
husband or his administrator or executor for the payment of
community obligations.1 49 To obtain a partition, the wife need
only assume personal responsibility for half the community obli-
gations by unconditionally accepting the community, unless she
has bound herself personally for a greater amount. 50
Conclusion
The articles of the above marriage contract suggest change
in many areas of community property law which, by their very
unworkability, demand change. They are not recommended as
the solution to the problems; rather, they are submitted only as
a solution. What the writer seeks, above all, is to promote a
persons for all of the community obligations since the obligations were per-
sonally incurred by the husband. See generally Comment, 30 LA. L REV. 603,
610, 614 (1970). See also note 120 supra.
145. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2406, which reads in part as follows: "The effects
which compose the partnership or community of gains, are divided into
two equal portions between the husband and the wife, or between their heirs,
at the dissolution of the marriage .... "
146. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2410: "Both the wife and her heirs or assigns
have the privilege of being able to exonerate themselves from the debts
contracted during the marriage, by renouncing the partnership or community
of gains."
147. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2411: "The wife, who renounces, loses every sort
of right to the effects of the partnership or community of gains. But she
takes back all her effects, whether dotal or extradotal."
148. LA. R.S. 9:2821 (1950): "At the dissolution for any cause of the
marital community, the wife may accept the community of acquets and
gains under the benefit of inventory, in the same manner and with the
same benefits and advantages as are allowed heirs to accept a succession
under the benefit of inventory." See generally LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1032-68,
which govern the acceptance of a succession with benefit of inventory.
149. Washington v. Palmer, 213 La. 79, 34 So.2d 382 (1948); Tomme v.
Tomme, 174 La. 123, 139 So. 901 (1932); Succession of Dumestre, 42 La. Ann.
411 (1890).
150. See Comment, 30 LA. L. REv. 603 (1970), in which the writer fully
discusses this area of the law.
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heightened awareness of the different areas in which variation
is possible; the provisions recommended above must be under-
stood in this manner, or they can not be understood at all.
Joseph E. LeBlanc, Jr.
THE POSSESSOR'S RIGHT TO COMPENSATION*
A possessor of land is almost certain to incur some expense
during his possession in an effort to improve and preserve the
land. The land may be cleared and prepared for habitation and
cultivation; ditches may be dug; repairs and additions may be
made; or completely new structures may be erected. The pos-
sessor may pay the taxes on the land and obtain insurance to
protect his investment. If the possessor is subsequently evicted
by one who proves to be the rightful owner, problems arise
when the possessor claims compensation for some or all of his
improvements and expenses.
At present some uncertainty exists as to exactly what
improvements and expenses are subject to compensation and
under what circumstances compensation should be allowed. The
purpose of this Comment is to examine and determine the rights
of the possessor who has been evicted by the rightful owner'
to claim reimbursement for his improvements and expenses
under the provisions of articles 508, 2314, and 3453 of the Lou-
isiana Civil Code. These articles specifically apply to possessors
evicted through judgments obtained in possessory 2 and peti-
tory actions.8 The discussion will, however, touch upon other
articles which allow possessors evicted through other types of
action (such as collation in kind,4 warranty, 5 and lesion beyond
moiety0 ) to recover similar expenses. Although the good or
bad faith of the possessor 7 will bear upon his right to recover,
no detailed discussion of these elements will be undertaken.
Finally, no attempt will be made to examine the possessor's
* This article was prepared in conjunction with the Awards Program of
the Institute of Civil Law Studies at the Louisiana State University Law
School.
1. This discussion is limited to the rights of possessors as distinguishable
from other third persons on the land, i.e., trespassers, intermeddlers, etc.
2. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 3454-56; LA. CODE CIv. P. arts. 3655, 3660.
3. LA. CODE CIv. P. arts. 3651-53.
4. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 1256-59.
5. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2506-10.
6. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2598-99.
7. LA. Crv. CODE arts. 502, 503, 3451-53, 3489.
